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Empirical work shows that health insurance coverage improves children’s health 
and that healthier children have better educational and labor market outcomes. This 
suggests that the benefits of higher insurance rates among children go beyond 
improvements in health. However, there are no investigations in the United States that 
track the long-term socioeconomic benefits of health insurance coverage during 
childhood. Using data from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to 
estimate family fixed effects models, I find evidence that health insurance coverage at 
ages 0-4 has a positive effect on test scores in mathematics, reading recognition, reading 
comprehension, and vocabulary at ages 5-14. 
The second essay in this dissertation, co-authored with Charles Courtemanche, 
investigates the effect of the Massachusetts health care reform on self-reported health. 
The main objective of this reform was to achieve universal health insurance coverage 
through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and subsidies. This reform 
was later used as a model for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
Using individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and a 
difference in differences estimation strategy, this essay provides evidence that this reform 
led to better overall self-assessed health. Several determinants of overall health, including 
physical health, mental health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, 
and moderate physical activity also improved. 
 
 
Public food assistance programs share the fundamental goal of helping needy and 
vulnerable people in the U.S. obtain access to nutritious foods that they might not 
otherwise be able to afford. These programs also have other objectives, such as 
improving recipients’ health, furthering children’s development and school performance. 
To investigate these broader impacts, the third chapter of this dissertation, co-authored 
with David Ribar, examines the relationship between participation in food assistance 
programs, family routines and time use. Results from fixed effects models estimated 
using longitudinal data from the Three-City Study indicate that SNAP participation is 
negatively associated with homework routines. WIC participation on the other hand, is 
positively associated with family routines in general and with dinner routines, homework 
routines, and family-time routines in particular.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE OUTCOMES 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Using data from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this 
paper finds evidence that health insurance coverage at ages 0-4 has a positive effect on 
test scores in mathem1atics, reading recognition, reading comprehension, and vocabulary 
at ages 5-14. The observation that children without health insurance have worse health 
than their insured counterparts is one of the motivations behind the efforts to increase 
health insurance coverage for children, including the recent Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. This paper provides evidence that the benefits of insurance 
coverage for children go beyond improvements in health and include lasting effects on 
children’s cognitive outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
 
The large number of people without health insurance coverage and the difficulties 
they have obtaining adequate medical care are concerns behind the health insurance 
market reforms over the last two decades, including the recent Patient Protection and
 2 
Affordable Care Act. Empirical work shows that in the case of children health insurance 
coverage improves health (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; 1996b; Currie et al., 2008), and that 
healthier children have better educational and labor market outcomes (Case, et al., 2005; 
Currie et al., 2010). This suggests that the benefits of higher insurance rates among 
children go beyond improvements in health. However, as pointed out by the Baker 
Institute (2009), there are no investigations in the United States that track the long-term 
socioeconomic benefits of health insurance coverage during childhood. This paper takes a 
first step toward filling this void by using a dataset that follows children over time to 
investigate the effect that health insurance coverage early in childhood has on cognitive 
outcomes later in childhood.   
According to standard economic theory the production of children’s health 
depends on market goods, like medical care, the initial endowment of health, and time 
invested in health producing activities (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Currie, 2009). Health 
insurance coverage increases the consumption of medical care because it reduces the 
price faced by the consumer (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). If this additional medical care is 
not redundant, it translates into better health. Previous research demonstrates that having 
health insurance coverage increases medical care consumption (Dafny and Gruber, 2000; 
Aizer, 2007) and improves health among children (Currie and Gruber 1996a; Currie et al., 
2008). 
The literature also documents the existence of a positive relationship between 
childhood health and future cognitive and educational outcomes. For example, Case and 
Paxson (2010) use children’s height for age as a summary measure for health and find 
 3 
that it is positively correlated with children’s cognitive development and school progress. 
Case et al. (2005) find that chronic conditions at age 7 reduce the number of proficiency 
tests passed by age 16. Currie et al. (2010) find that physical conditions at ages 9-13 and 
14-18 have negative effects on literacy, math achievement and reduce the likelihood of 
being in grade 12 by age 17. Currie (2009) and Currie et al. (2010) argue that good health 
has a positive effect on schooling because it raises children’s productivity at school, 
while poor health impairs cognitive skills. If health is an input in the production of 
cognitive skills, and if these skills are self-producing, meaning that past period skills are 
an input in the production of future skills (Cunha and Heckman, 2008), then health will 
also have a lasting effect on cognitive skills.  
The links between health and cognitive outcomes and between health insurance 
and children’s health suggest that it is possible that health insurance coverage affects 
cognitive and educational outcomes. However, it is also possible that the health 
improvements caused by health insurance coverage are not large enough to affect 
children’s cognitive outcomes. Furthermore, since health is multidimensional it is 
possible that health insurance improves health in dimensions that are not relevant for the 
production of cognitive skills.  
Understanding the relationship between health insurance and cognitive outcomes 
is important because according to the U.S. Census Bureau in 2010 more than 8 million 
children did not have health insurance of any kind. Even though the implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act is expected to reduce this number greatly it is still possible that 
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this law is fully or partially repealed or that during the budgetary process it’s financing 
gets reduced preventing its full implementation.  
Two previous studies have looked at the effect of health insurance coverage on 
children’s educational outcomes. Chen and Zhe Jin (2012) find that the 2006 health 
insurance expansions in rural China had a positive effect on the school enrollment of six-
year-old children, but find no effect for other cohorts. Levine and Schanzenbach (2009) 
investigate the effect of Medicaid and SCHIP expansions on fourth and eight graders 
state-average test scores in mathematics and reading. They find that a 50 percentage point 
increase in Medicaid eligibility at birth increases state-average reading test scores by 0.09 
of a standard deviation, but find no effect for test scores in mathematics.  
 This paper contributes to the literature by using individual-level data from the 
Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY) to investigate the 
impact of health insurance coverage during early childhood (ages 0-4) on cognitive 
outcomes measured by standardized test scores in mathematics, reading recognition, 
reading comprehension, and vocabulary taken during late childhood (ages 5-14). Family 
and child characteristics are included in regression analyses, and family fixed effects 
models are used as the main estimation strategy to control for time invariant 
unobservable characteristics of the household. The paper also investigates if the 
associations found depend on whether children have private health insurance or Medicaid 
coverage. These two types of coverage may have different impacts on cognitive 
outcomes because the intensity and availability of medical care may differ depending on 
the type of coverage children have. For example, many doctors do not participate in 
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Medicaid, which increases the waiting times for children seeking medical attention 
(Skaggs et al., 2006; Hwang et al., 2005). There is also evidence that shows that doctors 
spend less time with Medicaid patients than with private insured patients (Decker, 2007). 
In contrast, Currie and Thomas (1995) show that children covered by Medicaid have 
more doctor checkups than private insured children. Dissimilarities in the medical care 
received may translate into differences in health outcomes, which may ultimately affect 
children’s cognitive outcomes. 
The empirical estimates show that health insurance coverage at ages 0-4 improves 
Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) scores in mathematics, reading recognition, 
reading comprehension and vocabulary at ages 5-14. Both private health insurance and 
Medicaid coverage have similar effects on these cognitive outcomes. Additional analyses 
reveal that the effect of health insurance on test scores does not disappear over time. 
Health insurance coverage at ages 0-4 has a positive effect on PIATs taken at ages 5-9 
and on PIATs taken at ages 10-14. Health insurance coverage at ages 5-9 also improves 
test scores at ages 10-14.  Health insurance coverage has a larger effect for boys than for 
girls, and the evidence suggests that the effects are larger for children living in low-
income households.  
 
Empirical Approach 
 
Suppose that the lifetime of a child up to age 14 can be divided in two periods. 
Early childhood, which starts at the time the child is born and ends at age 4, and late 
childhood, which begins when the child is 5 and ends at age 14. According to Almond 
and Currie (2010), investments before the age of 5 have lasting consequences in 
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children’s outcomes and should be distinguished from later investments. The scores of 
tests taken at late childhood are measures of cognitive achievement; they are produced 
with contemporaneous inputs that include home investments, health and cognitive skills. 
Current health depends on the investments made to preserve it, which include health 
insurance coverage, and past period health. Cognitive skills depend on past period 
cognitive skills and are also affected by past period health. Replacing the relationships 
that describe the production of health and cognitive skills in the test scores equation 
results in the following reduced form equation: 
 
yi,f,late = 0 + 1hi,f,endowment + 2ci,f,endowment + 3HIi,f,early + 4HIi,f,late +5Xi,f,early +        (1.1) 
6Xi,f,late + i,f,early-late        
           
 
Equation (1.1) says that the score in a cognitive ability test (yi,f,late) for child i in 
family f taken at late childhood, is a function of endowments of health (hi,f,endowment) and 
cognitive skills (ci,f,endowment), health insurance coverage during early (HIi,f,early) and late 
(HIi,f,late) childhood, other observable inputs during early (Xi,f,early) and late (Xi,f,late) 
childhood, and other unobservable characteristics during early and late childhood (i,f,early-
late). 
As mentioned, health insurance might affect cognitive outcomes through its effect 
on health. 
1
 If so, the size of the parameters 3 and 4 depend on the magnitude in which 
health insurance affects health and the magnitude in which health affects test scores. If 
health insurance has a large effect on children’s health and if the production of test scores 
                                                        
1 Health insurance coverage could also improve children’s cognitive outcomes by other mechanisms such 
as greater economic stability, reduced stress and earlier identification of cognitive disabilities.  
 7 
is very sensitive to this input, then we would observe a large effect of health insurance on 
test scores. If instead health insurance has a positive but small effect on health, or if test 
scores were not very sensitive to changes in health, then we would observe a small effect 
of health insurance on test scores.  
 Estimation of equation (1.1) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) yields 
unbiased estimates of 3 and 4 when health insurance is not correlated with unobservable 
characteristics that also affect test scores. Controlling for a detailed list of covariates 
reduces the possibility of confounders but does not eliminate it. To illustrate this we 
could re-write the error term in equation (1.1) as: i,f,early-late =  i,f,early-late + f,  where f 
represents time invariant characteristics of the family. Focusing the discussion on the 
coefficient estimate of early childhood health insurance coverage we have that if cov(f, 
HIi,f,early)  0 then the OLS coefficient estimate would be biased. Moreover, if f  0 and 
cov(f, HIi,f,early)  0 then the OLS estimate would be upward biased. This could happen if 
for example f represents family ability and if children in high-ability families were more 
likely to have higher test scores and also more likely to have health insurance coverage. 
On the other hand, if f  0 andcov(f, HIi,f,early) < 0 then OLS the estimate would be 
downward biased. This could happen if, for instance, f represents family’s health and if 
healthier parents were less likely to buy family health insurance coverage and at the same 
time more likely to have children with higher test scores. 
 The CNLSY dataset has information on multiple siblings within a household, 
which allows implementing a family fixed effect estimator. Using this estimation strategy 
will result in unbiased estimates of the coefficient of interest if there are no remaining 
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time-varying unobservable family covariates or unobserved individual heterogeneity 
correlated with health insurance coverage and test scores.  
The presence of time-varying unobserved family characteristics associated with 
health insurance coverage and test scores would bias family fixed effects estimates. 
Besides including a detailed list of time-varying controls to reduce this probability, I also 
test the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications described in more detail in 
the results section. 
The presence of child-specific unobserved heterogeneity would also result in 
biased fixed effects coefficient estimates. Following Griliches (1979) Bound and Solon 
(1999) show that the inconsistency of the Fixed Effect (OLS) estimator is proportional to 
the fraction of between-siblings (cross-sectional) variation in the dependent variable due 
to the individual endogenous component. For example, if parents exhibit a compensatory 
behavior and insure only the more disadvantaged children, who are also more likely to 
have lower test scores, then both FE and OLS would be downward biased, and if parents 
exhibit a reinforcing behavior and insure only the more talented children then both OLS 
and FE would be upward biased. However, the inconsistency of the FE estimator would 
be larger than the OLS estimator if the endogenous variation comprises a larger share of 
the between-siblings variation in test scores than it does of the cross-sectional variation.
2
  
                                                        
2
 Medicaid coefficient estimates could be more sensitive to children unobservables if children obtain 
coverage only after they suffer a health shock and visit an Emergency Room. However, Medicaid 
enrollment rates have been above 73% since 1986 (Gruber, 2000; Kenney et al. 2009), which suggests that 
a large number of children enroll in Medicaid independently of their health status. In contrast, the 
characteristics of private health insurance policies reduce the probability of enrollment based on child 
specific cofounders because family policies have fixed enrollment periods, require waiting periods before 
covering people with pre-existing conditions, and generally charge the same premium regardless of the 
number of children being covered. Under the HIPAA insurance companies could establish waiting period 
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The use of family fixed effects can also aggravate measurement error problems 
relative to OLS (Griliches, 1979). If there is random measurement error of the 
independent variables of interest OLS coefficient estimates are downward biased. Black 
et al. (2000) show that when the independent variables of interest are binary, which is the 
way health insurance coverage is measured, OLS estimates would also be downward 
biased if the variance of the measurement error is smaller than the covariance between 
the true value of the variable and its measurement error. Since family fixed effects 
exacerbate measurement error bias, if there is measurement error in the health insurance 
variables and if the covariance between the true value of health insurance and its 
measurement error is smaller than the variance of the measurement error, then fixed 
effects estimates would represent a lower bound of the true effect. 
 
Data  
 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) is a nationally 
representative sample of men and women (when weighted) born between January 1, 1957 
and December 31, 1964 who have been surveyed since 1979. In 1986, the Children of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth began interviewing the sons and daughters of 
female NLSY79 respondents every two years. By 2008, a total of 10,488 children born to 
NLSY79 female respondents had been surveyed at some point.  
The paper’s conceptual framework describes the lifetime of a child as a two-
period model: early childhood, ages 0 to 4, and late childhood, ages 5 to 14. The main 
                                                                                                                                                                     
for preexisting conditions of up to 12 months (up to 18 months for late enrollees). These waiting periods 
could be shorter with if the person can show prior insurance coverage of that preexisting condition. Before 
HIPAA was enacted insurers could choose not to cover preexisting conditions.  
 10 
interest of this paper is to measure the effect of health insurance coverage during early 
childhood on test scores measured at late childhood. This means that children in the 
estimating sample have to be interviewed at least once during each of these periods. 
Furthermore, children have to be interviewed at least once before they were 2 years old to 
have measures of family and individual conditions, including health insurance coverage, 
around the time of birth. This means that only those born between 1984 and 2003 can be 
part of the estimating sample. There are 6,572 children surveyed by the CNLSY that 
satisfy this restriction, of which 5,017 were first surveyed before age 2 and re-
interviewed after age 5.
3
 Family fixed effects require that children in the estimating 
sample have siblings who were also surveyed; there are 3,508 children who satisfy this 
condition. It is important to note that even though late childhood is defined as ages 5-14, 
children were on average 12 years old the last time they were interviewed and there are 
some children who were as young as 5 years old the last time they participated on the 
CNLSY. 
This paper uses the scores in the Peabody Individual Achievement Test in 
mathematics (PIAT-M), reading recognition (PIAT-R), reading comprehension (PIAT-C) 
and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (PPVT) to measure cognitive 
outcomes. The PIAT-M gauges attainment in mathematics, the PIAT-R measures word 
recognition and pronunciation, the PIAT-C evaluates a child’s ability to derive meaning 
from sentences that are read silently, and the PPVT provides an estimate of verbal ability 
                                                        
3 Not all eligible children are interviewed every survey wave because of attrition. For instance, between 
1986 and 1998 the CNLSY could not collect information for 10 to 20 percent of all eligible children 
(Aughinbaugh, 2004). 
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by evaluating hearing vocabulary for standard American English. These assessments 
have been widely used to measure cognitive achievements (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2010; 
Baum, 2003; Ruhm, 2004; and Ruhm, 2008). PIATs are administered every survey year 
to all children ages 5 to 14, while the PPVT follows a more complex administration 
pattern. Every survey wave 10-11 year old children take the PPVT, along with those who 
previously missed an assessment Children older than 3 were also tested in 1986 and in 
1992.  
PIATs, and achievement tests in general, measure how much knowledge the test 
taker has accumulated in a particular area. Unlike intelligence tests, which are set before 
the age of 10, achievement tests are quite malleable and therefore sensitive to investments 
made to improve them (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Cognitive ability, measured by 
achievement tests like the PIAT, has been found to have a positive effect on educational 
achievement, employment, and wages (Heckman et al., 2006). Therefore, even though 
the CNLSY does not have information on children’s school grades, or enough 
information to examine children’s future labor market performance, the results found in 
this paper provide an indication of the potential effect of health insurance coverage on 
these other outcomes. 
The analysis in this paper uses age-specific normed test scores provided by the 
CNLSY that were re-normalized to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1 to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results.
4
 The majority of children were interviewed 
more than once during this period, which means that they have more than one 
                                                        
4 Unreported regressions using the original age-normed scores provided by the CNLSY give results that are 
qualitatively the same to the ones reported on this paper.  
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observation for each test. For this reason the dependent variables used in the regression 
analyses are average test scores obtained during late childhood (ages 5-14). Because 
cognitive outcomes can change a lot during this time frame, I also perform separate 
analyses for test scores obtained at ages 5-9 and at ages 10-14.  
Every wave of the core survey of the NLSY79 asks mothers two questions about 
the health insurance status of their children. One of them asks if the health care of the 
child is covered by an individual or employer-provided plan; the other question asks 
whether Medicaid covers the health care of the child. Using these measures I create three 
dummy variables to measure health insurance coverage: one for private health insurance 
coverage, a second for Medicaid coverage, and a third for health insurance coverage in 
general, either Medicaid or private health insurance.
5
 Early and late childhood health 
insurance coverage is measured using the average of these dummy variables over early 
and late childhood respectively. Separate analyses use averages over ages 0-4, 5-9 and 
10-14.  
The CNSLY obtains information about household and children’s time-varying 
characteristics. These data include household income, the HOME-SF score (a measure 
oriented to capture the quality of the home environment), the number and ages of people 
living in the household, welfare participation, mother’s: education, marital, and 
employment status, employment status of the spouse, and children’s age.
 6 
The CNSLY 
                                                        
5 If the mother reported that the child had both Medicaid and private health insurance, I assume that the 
child was using private health insurance coverage only. 
6 The HOME-SF contains self-reported information on time spent by the mother promoting cognitive 
stimulation of the children, mother emotional support, and home investments that facilitate learning. This 
measure has been used extensively to capture home inputs in the production of cognitive skills (e.g. Todd 
and Wolpin, 2007; Ruhm, 2008; Cunha and Heckman, 2008).  
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also obtains information about household and children’s time invariant characteristics 
such as: age of the mother at the time of birth, number of drinks and cigarettes the mother 
consumed during pregnancy, which are used as proxy measures of endowments of 
children’s health and cognitive skills, child’s fetal growth (i.e. birthweight divided by 
length of pregnancy), race, birth order and year of birth. Regression analyses also control 
for the year of the child’s birth and the number of times the child was interviewed during 
early and late childhood. For some children information on one or more control variables 
is missing. To avoid excluding these observations from the analysis, the relevant 
regressors are set to zero and dummy variables were created denoting the presence of 
missing values. For example, if family income was not reported this variable is given a 
value of zero and the dummy variable “missing family income” is set to one.
7
 
Table 1.1 shows health insurance coverage patterns (unweighted) at ages 0-4, 5-9 
and 10-14 for children in the sample. The category “always health insurance” coverage 
means that every time the child was interviewed by the CNLSY the mother reported that 
he had health insurance coverage (either private or Medicaid). It is possible that the child 
had no health insurance between surveys, but that information is not collected by the 
CNLSY. Table 1.1 shows that during early childhood 84.6 percent of children always had 
health insurance coverage. Private health insurance is the most common form of 
insurance, with 65.9 percent of children always having that type of coverage during early 
                                                        
7 This was done for fetal growth, average family income during early and late childhood, average welfare 
participation during early and late childhood, average HOME-SF score during early and late childhood, 
average education, marital, and employment status of the mother during early and late childhood, number 
of cigarettes and number of drinks consumed during pregnancy. 
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childhood. Medicaid coverage is less frequent; during early childhood 9.7 percent of 
children can be classified as always having that type of coverage.  
 The first column of Table 1.2 shows sample means of test scores taken at ages 5-
14 and of observable characteristics during early and late childhood for all the children in 
the sample. Table 1.2 also shows sample means for children classified as “always with 
health insurance coverage of any type”, “always with private health insurance”, “always 
with Medicaid coverage” and “always uninsured” at ages 0-4. 
8
 Stars denote that for 
children with health insurance coverage the number is statistically different from the 
“always uninsured” mean. The top panel of the Table shows that children in the “always 
health insurance” category have higher test scores than uninsured children, but if children 
are further divided according to type of coverage it can be seen that children with private 
health insurance have the highest test scores and that those with Medicaid have the lowest.  
The bottom panel of Table 1.2 shows that children with different types of 
coverage also have different observable characteristics. On average, those in the “always 
private health insurance” category live in higher income households, have better home 
environments (measured by the Home S-F score) and have mothers that are more likely 
to be married, employed, and more educated than those who did not have health 
insurance. On average, children without health insurance live in wealthier households 
than children with Medicaid coverage but in poorer households than children with private 
health insurance. This suggests that children with no health insurance do not meet 
                                                        
8 Sample means for children who had a given type of coverage for some periods, but not the others are not 
presented to save space, but are available upon request. 
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Medicaid eligibility requirements, but at the same time do not live in households that can 
afford to buy private insurance coverage.  
In order to implement family fixed effects as an estimation strategy, it is 
important to have within family variation in health insurance coverage. Table 1.3 shows 
the number of families in which children have differences in the amount of time they had 
health insurance coverage of a given type during early childhood. There are 326 families 
(out of 1,461 in the sample) where children have sibling differences in the amount of time 
they had health insurance coverage during early childhood. The number of families in 
which there is within family variation in private health insurance coverage and Medicaid 
coverage is 444 and 331, respectively. 
 
 
Results from Multivariate Models 
 
Health Insurance and Children’s Cognitive Outcomes 
 
Table 1.4 reports estimates from multivariate regression models of the impact of 
average health insurance coverage (with no distinction between public or private 
insurance) during early childhood on each of the four cognitive measures previously 
described. All specifications include the controls listed at the bottom of the Table. Odd 
numbered columns show ordinary least squares results and even numbered columns show 
family fixed effects estimates. As mentioned before, the sample only includes children 
who have one or more siblings also interviewed by the survey during early and late 
childhood. Observations in the regression analyses are not weighted. 
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OLS results show that children who always have health insurance coverage 
during early childhood have test scores in math (PIAT-M), reading recognition (PIAT-R), 
reading comprehension (PIAT-C) and vocabulary (PPVT) that are 0.126, 0.127, 0.102, 
and 0.099 standard deviations (SD) higher than uninsured children, respectively. 
However, only the result for PIAT-M is statistically distinguishable from zero. Note that 
family fixed effects coefficient estimates are larger than OLS indicating that OLS 
estimates are downwards biased due to unobserved heterogeneity. This is confirmed by 
F-tests that reject the null of no family fixed effects and Hausman tests that reject the null 
of no correlation between the error term and the regressors. Family fixed effects estimates 
show that children who always had health insurance coverage during early childhood 
have PIAT-M, PIAT-R, PIAT-C, and PPVT test scores that are respectively 0.229, 0.146, 
0.236, and 0.169 SDs higher than their uninsured siblings.
9
 All of these results are 
statistically significant. Dividing these coefficient estimates by five, the length in years of 
the early childhood period, gives us an estimate of the effect of an additional year of 
coverage. This transformation reveals that one year of health insurance coverage during 
early childhood increases test scores by 0.03 to 0.05 SDs. One implicit assumption of this 
transformation is that every year of coverage has the same effect on test scores. 
To investigate if the effect of health insurance on test scores varies depending on 
the type of coverage children have I replace the aggregate measure of health insurance 
coverage during early childhood by measures of private health insurance and Medicaid 
coverage. Table 1.5 shows the OLS and FE coefficient estimates for these variables. 
                                                        
9 Not reported estimates of contemporaneous health insurance coverage are also positive. 
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Family fixed effects estimates show that children who have private health insurance 
coverage every survey wave during early childhood have PIAT-M, PIAT-R, PIAT-C and 
PPVT scores that are 0.219, 0.160, 0.224 and 0.171 SDs higher than their uninsured 
siblings. These coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero, except for the 
estimate for PPVT scores. Coefficient estimates for Medicaid are very similar to the ones 
obtained for private health insurance and t-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that both 
types of coverage have the same effect on test scores.  
It is possible that the effect of early childhood health insurance coverage 
diminishes, as children get older. To investigate this hypothesis I divide the late 
childhood period in two sub-periods, ages 5-9 and 10-14. The top panel of Table 1.6 
shows fixed effects coefficient estimates of health insurance coverage during early 
childhood on test scores taken at ages 5-9. Regressions include the same controls listed at 
the bottom of Table 1.4. Averages of time-varying characteristics are calculated over ages 
0-4 and 5-9. Controls for number of interviews at those ages are also included. The 
results for PPVT scores are not shown because as discussed in the data section the 
majority of children are tested when they were 10 years old or older. The results in the 
top panel of Table 1.6 show that the scores of PIAT-M, PIAT-R and PIAT-C taken at 
ages 5-9 are 0.204, 0.195 and 0.190 SDs higher for siblings who always had health 
insurance coverage during early childhood. These coefficient estimates are very similar in 
magnitude to the ones obtained in Table 1.4 and are also statistically different from zero.  
The bottom panel of Table 1.6 shows fixed effects results for health insurance 
coverage on test scores taken at ages 10-14. Regressions include the same controls 
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described at the bottom of Table 1.4 and dummy variables that control for the number of 
times the child was interviewed at each age range.
10
 The effect of health insurance 
coverage at ages 0-4 on PIAT-M, PIAT-R and PIAT-C taken at ages 10-14 is smaller 
than the effect on test scores taken at ages 5-9; however the confidence intervals in both 
regressions overlap, suggesting that the effect of health insurance coverage during early 
childhood has a lasting effect on test scores. Health insurance coverage at ages 5-9 also 
has a positive effect on test scores taken at ages 10-14 and t-tests cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the effect of health insurance coverage at ages 0-4 is equal to the effect of 
health insurance coverage at ages 5-9 except for PPVT scores.
11
 Taken together these 
results suggest that past period health insurance coverage has a positive effect on 
children’s test scores and that early childhood health insurance coverage has a persistent 
effect on children’s cognitive outcomes. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
As mentioned before, even though all the econometric specifications include 
extensive controls for time-varying characteristics of the family, it is still possible that 
there are unobservable characteristics that could bias the coefficient estimates. In 
unreported regressions I test the sensitivity of the results reported in Table 1.4 to an 
alternative specification that includes interactions between the variables that measure the 
                                                        
10 Among children who were interviewed at least once when they were 5-9 years old 84 percent was 
interviewed twice and 8 percent was interviewed three times. Among children who were interviewed at 
least once when they were 10-14 years old 37 percent was interviewed twice and 51 percent was 
interviewed three times.  
11 The sample sizes are smaller than the ones used to estimate the results showed in Table 1.5 because 
there are some children who were not interviewed at ages 5-9 or at ages 10-14. Similar results were 
obtained when the same sample was used to estimate the regressions described at the top and bottom panels 
of Table 1.6. 
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marital and employment status of the mother. Changes in these variables could 
potentially result in variations in health insurance coverage and it is possible that there 
are interactions between these variables that affect both health insurance status and test 
scores. The results obtained using this alternative specification are very similar to the 
ones described in Table 1.4. 
12
  
 
Heterogeneity 
 
Table 1.7 shows the effect of health insurance coverage during early childhood 
separately for girls and boys. The samples consist of families that have two or more 
children of a given gender. The medical literature has documented that morbidity and 
mortality rates in early life are higher for boys than for girls (Wells, 1999; Copper et al. 
1994; Read et al. 1997); thus, if boys are more likely to need medical attention to treat or 
prevent health conditions they may also benefit more from having health insurance 
coverage. Results on Table 1.7 seem to confirm this hypothesis; health insurance during 
early childhood has a larger effect on boys’ PIAT-M, PIAT-R and PIAT-C scores. 
Interestingly, early childhood health insurance has a larger effect on PPVT scores for 
girls. 
                                                        
12 Another concern is that parents obtain health insurance coverage for their children in response to the 
child-specific propensity to get sick. As mentioned before, this is a bigger concern for the Medicaid 
coefficient estimates. To investigate if this is a serious concern for children in the sample I use the 
information on children’s age, family income, household size, year of interview and state of residence 
along with the Medicaid eligibility rules provided by Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) to impute children’s 
Medicaid eligibility status for every year that children were surveyed by the CNLSY. Using this 
information I tried to instrument children’s Medicaid enrollment during early and late childhood with their 
Medicaid eligibility during these periods. An instrumental variables estimator will provide unbiased 
estimates of Medicaid enrollment if Medicaid eligibility is exogenous from children’s underlying health. 
Unfortunately, Medicaid eligibility is a weak instrument for Medicaid enrollment once observable 
characteristics and family fixed effects are accounted for. 
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Table 1.8 shows FE results when the sample is divided according to average 
family income, expressed as a percentage of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), during early 
childhood. The top panel uses 100 percent of the FPL as the cutoff point, the middle 
panel uses 200 percent, and the bottom panel uses 300 percent as the cutoff point. 
Families in the sample are those who had two or more children ages 0-4 when their 
family income was below (or above) a given threshold. For children younger than 5, the 
average income threshold to be eligible for Medicaid between 1988 and 2008 was 170 
percent of the FPL. The middle panel of Table 1.8 shows that among children living in 
households with incomes less or equal to 200 percent of the FPL the effect of health 
insurance coverage ranges between 0.074SD-0.249SD. These estimates are larger than 
the ones for children living in households with incomes greater than 200 percent of the 
FPL, except for PPVT. The use of alternative cutoff points show that for children in low-
income households the effect of health insurance coverage is larger on PIAT-M and 
PIAT-R scores than for children in the rest of the sample. This is not always the case for 
PIAT-C and PPVT scores.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The evidence presented in this paper suggests that health insurance coverage 
during early childhood has a lasting effect on children’s cognitive outcomes. Both private 
health insurance and Medicaid coverage at ages 0-4 have positive and statistically 
significant effects on test scores taken at ages 5-14. Previous investigations have found 
that health insurance coverage improves children’s health and that children who are in 
better health have better cognitive and educational outcomes. This is the first paper that 
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uses individual level data to find a reduced form relationship between health insurance 
coverage and children’s cognitive outcomes. Levine and Schazenback (2009) found a 
positive relationship between Medicaid expansions at birth and state-average reading test 
scores of fourth-grade children. This investigation expands their analysis by using 
longitudinal, individual level data, information on private health insurance and Medicaid 
coverage, and a wider range of measures of cognitive outcomes.  
The strengths of this study are that the CNLSY data allows controlling for 
unobserved family heterogeneity that may be correlated with health insurance coverage 
and with children’s test scores. Also information on the CNLSY permits me to control for 
a detailed list of time-varying covariates. Fixed effects models could be biased if there is 
remaining unobserved family or child heterogeneity. However, sensitivity tests show that 
the results are robust to additional measures for family characteristics.  
There are several limitations that should be recognized. First, there are several 
sample restrictions that had to be imposed to the CNLSY in order to analyze children’s 
long-term outcomes and to be able to implement the fixed effects methodology. Children 
in the estimating sample live in households that have higher income, mothers in the 
estimated sample are older, more educated, and more likely to be married, children are 
more likely to have health insurance coverage in general, and more likely to have private 
health insurance in particular. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the 
benefits of health insurance coverage are larger for children living in low-income 
households; thus, we could expect that the effects of health insurance coverage will be 
larger for the complete CNLSY sample. Second, the length of the survey and the size of 
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the sample limited the type of outcomes that could be analyzed. It would be interesting to 
analyze the effect of health insurance in other school related outcomes, such as grade 
repetition or high school graduation, and also examine longer term outcomes such as 
earnings and employment status. However, previous evidence shows that the cognitive 
outcomes analyzed in this paper (PIATs) are correlated with educational attainment, 
employment, and wages (Heckman et al., 2006). This would suggest that the positive 
effect of health insurance on PIATs scores might also impact future educational and labor 
market outcomes. Finally, the availability of more detailed data on health outcomes 
would allow a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the relationship between 
health insurance and cognitive outcomes. 
  
 23 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1.1 - Distribution of Children According to the Proportion of Time they were 
Covered by Health Insurance. 
 
 
  
Health insurance 
coverage (any 
type) 
Private health 
insurance 
coverage 
Medicaid 
coverage 
Early childhood (ages 0-4) 
      Always 84.6 65.9 9.7 
   Sometimes 12.5 17.7 14.2 
    Never 2.9 16.4 76.1 
Late childhood (ages 5-9) 
      Always 86.6 68.7 8.2 
   Sometimes 11.6 18.4 13.8 
    Never 1.8 12.9 78.0 
Late childhood (ages 10-14) 
      Always 90.1 74.9 7.3 
   Sometimes 7.1 13.2 9.9 
    Never 2.8 11.9 82.8 
The table shows information for CNLSY siblings that were interviewed during early and late childhood. 
The categories “always” mean that every time the child was surveyed by the CNLSY the mother reported 
that child had that specific type of health insurance. Similarly, the category “never” means that every time 
the child was surveyed by the CNLSY the mother reported the child was not covered by that specific type 
of health insurance The categories “sometimes private health insurance” and “sometimes Medicaid” 
overlap because children could transition from having private health insurance to Medicaid coverage or 
vice versa.  
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Table 1.2 – Means of Outcomes and Observable Characteristics According to 
Health Insurance Coverage during Early Childhood (Ages 0-4). Sample of Siblings. 
 
 
  
All 
children 
Always 
health 
insurance 
(any type) 
Always 
private 
health 
insurance 
Always 
Medicaid 
Always 
uninsured 
Outcomes      
Average scores of test taken at ages 5-14     
PIAT-M (Mathematics)  10.02 10.08*** 10.25*** 9.36*** 9.70  
PIAT-R (Reading Recognition) 10.01 10.07** 10.23*** 9.39*** 9.71 
PIAT-C (Comprehension) 9.97 10.03* 10.20*** 9.34*** 9.74  
PPVT (Vocabulary) 10.09 10.16*** 10.35*** 9.37*** 9.75  
 
  
  
  
Time-Varying Controls (early childhood)  
   Household   
   Income (in 10,000$) 6.96 7.58*** 9.18*** 1.50*** 3.36 
Home Simple Form score 9.99 10.04 10.27*** 9.14*** 9.84 
Number of people ages 0-5 0.74 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.94 0.86 
Number of people 6-11 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.93*** 0.60 
Number of people 12-17 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.38*** 0.17 
Number of adults 2.01 1.99** 2.04 1.75*** 2.13 
Mother   
   AFDC participation 0.16 0.15 0.02*** 0.72*** 0.15 
Married 0.75 0.76 0.90** 0.23*** 0.79 
Single 0.14 0.14 0.04* 0.48*** 0.10 
Divorced or widow 0.12 0.10 0.06** 0.29*** 0.11 
Married with employed spouse 0.68 0.70 0.85*** 0.12*** 0.72 
    Employed 0.57 0.58** 0.67*** 0.16*** 0.54 
High school drop out 0.17 0.14** 0.06*** 0.54*** 0.34 
High school graduate 0.35 0.33** 0.32*** 0.33** 0.44 
Has college education 0.48 0.52*** 0.62*** 0.13* 0.21 
      
Time-Varying Controls (late childhood)  
   Household 
 
 
   Income (in 10,000$) 7.43 8.14*** 9.86*** 1.45*** 3.35 
Home Simple Form score 10.01 10.07** 10.34*** 8.82*** 9.71 
Number of people ages 0-5 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.66** 0.42 
Number of people 6-11 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.72 
Number of people 12-17 0.57 0.57 0.51* 0.88* 0.66 
Number of adults 1.99 1.99 2.04 1.76*** 2.15 
Mother   
   AFDC participation 0.12 0.10 0.02* 0.49*** 0.10 
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Married 0.69 0.71 0.84*** 0.18*** 0.65 
Single 0.10 0.10 0.03* 0.38*** 0.12 
Divorced or widow 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.44*** 0.23 
Married with employed spouse 0.62 0.65** 0.78*** 0.08*** 0.51 
    Employed 0.68 0.70 0.76** 0.37*** 0.61 
High school drop out 0.16 0.14 0.05** 0.54*** 0.21 
High school graduate 0.33 0.31** 0.30 0.33 0.34 
Has college education 0.51 0.55 0.65** 0.13*** 0.45 
      
Time Invariant Controls 
 
 
   Mother 
 
 
   Age at time of child's birth 28.9 29.3*** 29.6*** 26.1 26.1 
Cigarettes during pregnancy 0.27 0.25 0.19 0.52** 0.32 
Drinks during pregnancy 0.56 0.58* 0.59 0.66* 0.42 
Child 
 
 
   Female 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.52 
Child is non-white 0.46 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.85*** 0.67 
Fetal growth (a) 2.56 3.07** 3.11 2.91*** 3.17 
Birth order 2.36 2.33 2.10 3.10*** 2.27 
Age at last interview 12.5 12.4** 12.4** 12.6 12.8 
Asterisks indicate whether the means are significantly different for children with health insurance coverage 
to those without coverage. * p<0.1, **p<0.5,  *** p<0.01. (a) Fetal growth=birth weight/length of 
pregnancy. Test scores were normalized to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1. Information on 
observables characteristics during late childhood is not presented to save space. This information is 
available upon request.  
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Table 1.3 – Number of Families and Children with Variation in Health Insurance 
Coverage at Ages 0-4. 
 
 
No. of children with 
differences in coverage 
No. of families with 
differences in coverage 
 Health insurance (overall) 838 326 
Private health insurance  1,157 444 
Medicaid 892 331 
The total sample size is 3,508 children, who belong to 1,461 families. 
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Table 1.4 – The Effect of Early Childhood Health Insurance Coverage on Children’s Test Scores Taken at Ages 5-14. 
Sample of Siblings. OLS and Family Fixed Effects Results. 
 
 
  PIAT-M PIAT-R PIAT-C PPVT 
 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Avg. Health insurance 
coverage, ages 0-4 0.126* 0.229*** 0.127 0.146* 0.102 0.236*** 0.099 0.169* 
 
(0.071) (0.086) (0.078) (0.087) (0.071) (0.083) (0.077) (0.102) 
         
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,508 3,508 3,372 3,372 2,979 2,979 
Number of families  1,460  1,461  1,410  1,253 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Every column includes controls for children’s sex, race, dummies for birth 
order, dummies for birth of year, dummies for the number of times the child was interviewed during early and late childhood, fetal growth, number of 
cigarettes smoked during pregnancy, number of alcoholic drinks consumed during pregnancy, mother’s age at the time of the child’s birth. Time-varying 
controls include: average real household income (linear, quadratic and cubic), mother’s average: education, employment and marital status, average 
employment status of the spouse if the mother is married, average welfare participation, average household demographics (i.e. number of people ages 0-
5, 6-11, 12-17, and 18 and older), average test scores obtained in the Home Observation Measurement of the Environment Short Form (HOME-SF), 
average child’s age in months (linear and quadratic). Time-varying controls are averages calculated over the early (ages 0-4) and late (ages 5-14) 
childhood periods. Regressions also include controls for average health insurance coverage during late childhood. The dependent variables are average 
scores of test taken at ages 5-14. Test scores are normed to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1. 
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Table 1.5 – The Effect of Private Health Insurance and Medicaid Coverage on Children’s Test Scores Taken at Ages 5-
14. Sample of Siblings. 
 
 
  PIAT-M PIAT-R PIAT-C PPVT 
 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Avg. Private 
Insurance coverage, 
ages 0 - 4 0.100 0.219** 0.118 0.160* 0.067 0.224** 0.095 0.171 
 
(0.074) (0.091) (0.081) (0.093) (0.075) (0.087) (0.079) (0.112) 
Avg. Medicaid 
coverage, ages 0 - 4 0.165* 0.218** 0.153 0.113 0.149* 0.218** 0.043 0.093 
 
(0.087) (0.111) (0.098) (0.105) (0.085) (0.109) (0.101) (0.125) 
         
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,508 3,508 3,372 3,372 2,979 2,979 
Number of families 
 
1,460 
 
1,461 
 
1,410 
 
1,253 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Every column includes the same controls described at the bottom of Table 1.4. 
The dependent variables are average scores of test taken at ages 5-14. Test scores are normed to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1. 
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Table 1.6 – The Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on Children’s Test Scores. Family Fixed Effects Results. 
 
 
          
 
PIAT-M PIAT-R PIAT-C PPVT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test scores taken at ages 5-9 
    Avg. Health Insurance coverage (any type), ages 0-4 0.204** 0.195** 0.190* 
 
 
(0.095) (0.091) (0.105) 
      
Observations 3,387 3,388 3,079 
 Number of families 1,412 1,413 1,296 
      
Test scores taken at ages 10-14 
    Avg. Health Insurance coverage (any type), ages 0-4 0.209 0.087 0.129 0.021 
 
(0.127) (0.115) (0.102) (0.109) 
Avg. Health Insurance coverage (any type), ages 5-9 0.173 0.235* 0.219* 0.323** 
 
(0.142) (0.141) (0.126) (0.129) 
     
Observations 2,753 2,752 2,723 2,253 
Number of families 1,170 1,169 1,159 967 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Every column includes the same controls described at the bottom of Table 1.4. 
Regressions in the top panel control for the number of times children were interviewed at ages 0-4, 5-9, private health insurance and Medicaid coverage 
at ages 5-9. Time-varying controls are averaged over ages 0-4 and ages 5-9. The dependent variables in the top panel of the table are average scores of 
test taken at ages 5-9. Regressions in the bottom panel control for the number of times children were interviewed at ages 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, private health 
insurance and Medicaid coverage at ages 10-14. Time-varying controls are averaged over early (ages 0-4) and late (ages 5-14) childhood. The dependent 
variables in the bottom panel of the table are average scores of test taken at ages 10-14. Test scores are normed to have a mean of 10 and a standard 
deviation of 1.  
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Table 1.7 - The Effect of Health Insurance on Children's Test Scores Taken at Ages 5-14. Girls Versus Boys. Family 
Fixed Effects Results.  
 
 
  PIAT-M PIAT-R PIAT-C PPVT 
 
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys 
Avg. Health Insurance coverage, ages 0-4 0.014 0.481*** -0.041 0.409** 0.074 0.481** 0.289* 0.163 
 
(0.176) (0.168) (0.161) (0.191) (0.149) (0.190) (0.159) (0.251) 
Observations 973 1,106 973 1,104 925 1,048 821 931 
Number of families 438 501 438 500 415 476 371 425 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Every column includes the same controls described at the bottom of Table 4. 
The dependent variables are average scores of test taken at ages 5-14. Test scores are normed to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1. 
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Table 1.8 - The Effect of Health Insurance on Children's Test Scores Taken at Ages 5-14. Sample Divided According to 
Average Family Income during Early Childhood. Family Fixed Effects Results.  
 
 
  PIAT-M PIAT-R PIAT-C PPVT 
 
Average family income during early childhood  
 
<=100%fpl >100%fpl <=100%fpl >100%fpl <=100%fpl >100%fpl <=100%fpl >100%fpl 
Avg. Health Insurance 0.232 0.191* 0.232 0.191* 0.111 0.124 0.070 0.192* 
coverage, ages 0-4 (0.200) (0.101) (0.200) (0.101) (0.205) (0.122) (0.217) (0.114) 
Observations 720 2,489 721 2,489 683 2,400 651 2,080 
Number of families 280 1,075 281 1,075 268 1,038 259 905 
         
 
<=200%fpl >200%fpl <=200%fpl >200%fpl <=200%fpl >200%fpl <=200%fpl >200%fpl 
Avg. Health Insurance 0.223** 0.150 0.196* 0.020 0.249** 0.071 0.074 0.122 
coverage, ages 0-4 (0.113) (0.175) (0.114) (0.194) (0.115) (0.209) (0.150) (0.183) 
Observations 1,341 1,752 1,342 1,752 1,280 1,686 1,171 1,450 
Number of families 532 767 533 767 510 740 474 638 
         
 
<=300%fpl >300%fpl <=300%fpl >300%fpl <=300%fpl >300%fpl <=300%fpl >300%fpl 
Avg. Health Insurance 0.268*** 0.063 0.165* 0.115 0.238** 0.630* 0.161 0.095 
coverage, ages 0-4 (0.099) (0.276) (0.098) (0.360) (0.094) (0.341) (0.118) (0.355) 
Observations 2,041 1,108 2,042 1,108 1,959 1,063 1,776 893 
Number of families 837 495 838 495 807 477 738 402 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Every column includes the same controls described at the bottom of Table 1.4. 
The dependent variables are average scores of test taken at ages 5-14. Test scores are normed to have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1.
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CHAPTER II 
DOES UNIVERSAL COVERAGE IMPROVE HEALTH? THE MASSACHUSETTS  
EXPERIENCE 
(Co-authored with Charles Courtemanche) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 2006, Massachusetts passed health care reform legislation designed to achieve 
nearly universal coverage through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, 
and subsidies that later served as the model for national health care reform. We provide 
evidence that the Massachusetts reform improved self-assessed overall health, physical 
health, mental health, functional limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and 
moderate physical activity. The effect on overall health was strongest among women, 
minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with low incomes. Using the reform to 
instrument for health insurance coverage, we estimate a sizeable positive impact of 
coverage on health.  
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Introduction 
 
A major objective of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
signed into law in March of 2010 is to increase health insurance coverage in the United 
States to nearly universal levels through a combination of insurance market reforms, 
mandates, and subsidies. Although the law survived constitutional challenges, it remains 
at the center of political debate, with possibilities remaining for full or partial repeal or 
denial of financing during the budgetary process. This ongoing debate highlights the need 
for projections of the law’s impacts on health, health care utilization, and state and 
federal budgets. The multi-faceted nature of the reform and breadth of the population 
affected suggests that evidence from coverage expansions in other contexts, such as 
Medicaid, will be of only limited usefulness.  
The most similar intervention to date to the ACA is the Massachusetts health care 
reform of April 2006, entitled “An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, 
Accountable Health Care” and commonly called “Chapter 58” (Long, 2008).
13
 The law 
enabled Massachusetts to lower its uninsurance rate to 2% by 2010 through a strategy 
called “incremental universalism,” or “filling the gaps in the existing system … rather 
than ripping up the system and starting over” (Massachusetts’ Division of Health Care, 
Finance and Policy, 2010; Gruber, 2008a:52). Gruber (2010) describes Massachusetts’ 
approach to incremental universalism as involving a “three legged stool” of insurance 
market reforms, mandates, and subsidies (Gruber, 2010). 
                                                        
13
 For a more detailed description of the law, see Long (2008), McDonough et al. (2006) and Gruber (2008a, 
2008b). 
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The first leg of the stool reforms non-group insurance markets in an effort to 
ensure the availability of coverage for those without access to employer-provided or 
public insurance.  Insurers are not allowed to deny or drop coverage based on pre-
existing conditions (guaranteed issue) or vary premiums to reflect health status aside for 
limited adjustments for age and smoking status (community rating) (Kirk, 2000; 
McDonough et al., 2006). A health insurance exchange, the Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector Authority, offers plans developed by licensed health insurance 
companies for those without access to group markets. Enrollment on the Connector began 
in October 2006 for those with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty line (FPL), in 
January 2007 for those up to 300% FPL, and in May 2007 for everyone else. Additionally, 
private health insurance plans are required to provide coverage for young adults on their 
parents’ plans for up to two years after they are no longer dependents or until their 26
th
 
birthday (McDonough et al., 2006).
14
 
This first leg alone would likely lead to adverse selection and a “death spiral” 
with rising premiums gradually driving healthy individuals out of the non-group market. 
The second leg of the three-legged stool therefore involves mandates requiring adults to 
be covered by health insurance and employers to provide health insurance. Individuals 
without adequate coverage face a penalty of half of the lowest premium they would have 
paid in a Health Connector-certified plan. Employers with more than 10 employees must 
make a “fair and reasonable” contribution toward an employer health insurance plan or 
                                                        
14
 Guaranteed issue and community rating have been in place in Massachusetts since 1996. The 1996 law 
only allowed premiums to vary with age and geography; Chapter 58 further allowed them to vary with 
tobacco use. The insurance exchange and the requirement regarding young adults on their parents’ plans 
both started with Chapter 58. 
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pay a state assessment of up to $295 per full-time equivalent worker per year 
(Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority, 2008).
15
 The mandates took effect 
in July 2007. 
To help low- and middle-income households be financially able to comply with 
the mandate, the third leg of the Massachusetts reform provides subsidies and Medicaid 
expansions. Chapter 58 specifies that health insurance be free for people below 150% 
FPL and that premiums be subsidized on a sliding scale for those between 150% and 
300% FPL with no deductibles.
16
 The reform also expands Medicaid to cover children 
below 300% FPL (McDonough et al., 2006). 
Taking into account the costs of the subsidies and Medicaid expansions as well as 
the savings from reduced safety net payments, Raymond (2009) estimates the annual 
fiscal cost of the reform to be $707 million. Through a waiver allowing for a more 
flexible use of federal Medicaid matching money, half of this amount comes from the 
federal government, leaving the state government’s share at $353 million. 
Table 2.1 compares Massachusetts’ approach to incremental universalism with 
that of the Affordable Care Act.
17
 Though there are differences in some of the details, 
both the Massachusetts and national reforms were clearly motivated by the same “three-
                                                        
15 Minimum requirements plans must meet to satisfy the mandates include coverage for prescription drugs 
and preventive and primary care, as well as maximums on deductibles and out-of-pocket spending. 
16
 For instance, in 2008 a family with an income between 150% and 200% of the poverty line paid a 
premium of $35 per adult, while a family with an income in the 250% to 300% range paid $105 per adult. 
17
 Coverage expansion was the primary focus of both the Massachusetts and national reforms.  However, 
the national reform was more comprehensive, consisting of nine titles that each had their own reform 
agenda: I. Insurance Coverage, II. Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, III. Delivery 
System Reform, IV. Prevention and Wellness, V. Workforce initiatives, VI. Fraud, Abuse and Program 
Integrity, VII. Biologic Similars, VIII. Community Living Assistance Services and Supports, IX. Revenue 
Provisions (Patel and McDonough, 2010). 
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legged stool” approach to incremental universalism. Both featured guaranteed issue, 
community rating, insurance exchanges, mandates, Medicaid expansions, and subsidies. 
For these reasons, analyzing the effects of health care reform in Massachusetts provides 
the best available predictor to date of the implications of the Affordable Care Act. 
Given that recent nature of the Massachusetts reform, researchers are only 
beginning to understand its impacts. Long et al. (2009) find that by 2008 the uninsured 
rate decreased by 6.6 percentage points for the overall nonelderly population and 17.3 
percentage points for lower-income adults.
18
 Long and Stockely (2011) find a decrease in 
unmet medical needs because of cost among lower income adults but also some evidence 
of delays in care from being unable to find a provider. Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) show 
that Chapter 58’s impact on coverage was mitigated by the crowding out of private 
insurance. They also investigate the reform’s effect on self-assessed health, finding 
mixed results: an increase in the probability of reporting at least good health but a 
decrease in the probability of reporting at least very good health. Cogan et al. (2010) 
estimate that the reform increased employer-sponsored insurance premiums by about 6%. 
Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) show that the reform reduced levels of uninsurance by 36% 
among the population of hospital discharges. Length of stay and the number of inpatient 
admissions originating from the emergency room both decreased, with some evidence 
also suggesting an increase in the utilization of preventive services, a decline in 
hospitalizations for preventable conditions, and an improvement in quality of care. Miller 
(2011a) finds a reduction in non-urgent emergency room visits, consistent with the 
                                                        
18 These results support preliminary evidence found by Long (2008) using information from 2006 and 
2007. 
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newly-insured having access to such care in other settings. Miller (2011b) focuses on 
children’s outcomes, finding a substitution from emergency room care to office visits, a 
reduction in medical needs unmet because of cost, and an increase in the probability of 
reporting excellent health. Kowalski and Kolstad (2012) exploit the reform’s effect on 
employer-provided health insurance to show that wage reductions almost completely 
offset the cost of health insurance benefits. 
We contribute to this growing literature by examining Chapter 58’s effect on the 
self-assessed health of adults. Though many open questions remain about the reform’s 
effectiveness, as Gruber (2011b:190) writes, “the most significant of these is the impact 
of reform on the health of citizens.” We utilize individual-level data from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), which allows for the use of longer pre- and 
post-treatment periods, a much larger sample, and a broader range of health-related 
questions than Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), enabling us to obtain clearer results.
19
       
First, an ordered probit difference-in-differences analysis shows that the reform 
increased the probability of individuals reporting excellent or very good health while 
reducing their probability of reporting good, fair, or poor health. A variety of robustness 
checks and placebo tests support a causal interpretation of the results. The estimates 
suggest that annual government spending for each adult transitioned into excellent or 
very good health is $9,827, split evenly between the Massachusetts and federal 
                                                        
19
 Specifically, Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) use Current Population Survey supplements and compare a 
pre-treatment period of 2005-2006 with a post-treatment period of 2008.  They conduct a difference-in-
differences analysis with other New England states as controls.  Their sample size is 41,873.  In contrast, 
we utilize data from 2001-2010 and have a sample size of 2,879,296 in our main analysis and 340,592 
when we restrict the sample to New England.    
 
 
 
38 
governments. We then provide evidence that the reform improved a number of 
determinants of overall self-assessed health: physical health, mental health, functional 
limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity. Next, we 
examine heterogeneity and find that the reform’s effect on overall health was strongest 
for women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with incomes low enough to qualify 
for the law’s subsidies. Notably, the estimates imply a 24% reduction in the disparity in 
self-reported health between blacks and whites. Finally, we exploit the plausibly 
exogenous variation in coverage created by the reform to estimate that obtaining health 
insurance leads to a large improvement in health. 
 
Health Insurance and Health 
 
An important part of the argument for universal coverage is the assumption that 
health insurance improves health. As quoted by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), Levy and 
Meltzer (2008) write, 
 
The central question of how health insurance affects health, for whom it matters, 
and how much, remains largely unanswered at the level of detail needed to inform 
policy decisions. … Understanding the magnitude of health benefits associated 
with insurance is not just an academic exercise …, it is crucial to ensuring that the 
benefits of a given amount of public spending on health are maximized (p. 400). 
 
This section provides a brief summary of theoretical and empirical research on the topic 
and summarizes our contribution to this broader literature. 
Grossman (1972) models health as a durable capital stock that is also an input in 
the production of healthy time. Health capital depends on the initial endowment of health, 
past period health, and past period investments made to preserve it. Medical care and 
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time spent in health producing activities are the main forms of health investment. Every 
period people face uncertainty as to whether they will be affected by a negative health 
shock, so they buy health insurance to protect themselves against unexpected medical 
costs. Because health insurance reduces the price of care faced by the consumer it 
increases the demand for medical care (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). This increase in 
consumption of care could result in better health, but if the additional medical care is 
redundant health outcomes may remain the same or even deteriorate. This effect is 
sometimes known as “flat of the curve” medical care, because diminishing returns in the 
health production function imply that at some point the health gains associated with more 
medical care may be very small (Doyle, 2005).  
The majority of empirical investigations into the relationship between health 
insurance and health are observational studies that use multivariate regression analysis. A 
review of these studies by Hadley (2003) shows that 15 out of the 20 published between 
1991 and 2001 found a positive association between health insurance coverage and 
recovery from health conditions such as cancer, trauma, and appendicitis. Health 
insurance was also associated with better overall health status and lower mortality risk in 
all of the studies that examined these outcomes. However, these relationships cannot be 
interpreted as causal because the research designs did not address the potential for 
unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. 
During the 1970’s the RAND Health insurance experiment randomly assigned 
families to health insurance plans with coinsurance rates ranging from 0% to 95%, with 
all medical expenses covered over a threshold. Medical care use increased among people 
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assigned to plans with lower coinsurance rates, but health outcomes only improved 
among the poor (Manning et al., 1987). However, this experiment only shows the impact 
of health insurance along the intensive margin from less to more generous coverage, not 
the extensive margin of no coverage to any coverage. It is also unclear to what extent 
findings from the 1970s are applicable today.  
Some studies have taken advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation provided 
by public insurance programs like Medicaid and Medicare in order to address the 
endogeneity of coverage. Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b) find that Medicaid 
expansions decrease infant mortality and low birth weight, while Dafny and Gruber 
(2005) show that they also reduce avoidable hospitalizations among children. Most 
recently, Finkelstein et al. (2011) exploit a 2008 Oregon lottery in which winners were 
given the chance to apply for Medicaid to show that coverage improves self-reported 
physical and mental health. The randomization allows for clean identification of the 
causal effects of Medicaid eligibility, at least among the low-income uninsured lottery 
participants.   
Evidence on the effect of Medicare on the health of seniors is mixed. Card et al. 
(2004) find that obtaining Medicare coverage at age 65 improves the self-assessed health 
of Hispanics and people with low levels of education; however, the effect for the whole 
sample is smaller and insignificant. Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) show that 10 years 
after the introduction of Medicare there was not a statistically significant impact on 
mortality rates for people older than 65. Card et al. (2009) find more favorable results: a 
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reduction in the 7-day mortality rate among emergency room patients older than 65 
compared to those right below that cutoff.  
A few studies attempt to estimate the causal effect of insurance on health in 
contexts other than public programs, again finding mixed results. Pauly (2005) uses 
marital status and firm size as instruments for private insurance coverage and finds a 
positive but insignificant effect of insurance on self-reported health and a negative but 
insignificant effect on the probability of having a chronic condition. Doyle (2005) shows 
that uninsured patients receive less medical care and have higher mortality rates than 
insured patients after a random health shock (a car accident). 
To summarize, the extant literature suggests that health insurance coverage 
appears to improve health in some contexts but not others. The uninsured in the U.S. 
consist of a number of groups, including those too sick to obtain coverage, those too 
healthy to feel insurance is necessary, and those too poor to afford private coverage but 
not poor enough to qualify for public insurance programs. Any attempt at universal 
coverage in the U.S. will therefore involve coverage expansions across a highly 
heterogeneous group, making it unclear the extent to which these prior findings are 
applicable. The Massachusetts health care reform provides a unique opportunity to 
examine an intervention that affects a large portion of the uninsured population.     
 
Data 
 
 Health summarizes a combination of factors that reflect physical and mental 
well-being. Among the usual indicators used to measure health in empirical 
investigations are mortality rates, hospitalization rates, and self-assessments of overall 
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health. Our study focuses on self-assessments. State-level mortality information is not 
currently available for a long enough time after the reform to construct an adequate post-
treatment period. Even if more recent data were available, examining mortality rates 
alone would not capture incremental improvements in health resulting from, for instance, 
better treatment for a chronic but non-life threatening condition. Hospitalizations are not 
an appropriate measure of overall health in this context since, to the extent that 
hospitalizations are price sensitive, changes in hospitalizations after the reform might 
simply be a direct result of the lower price faced by the newly-insured rather than 
changes in health. 
 This paper uses data from the BRFSS, a telephone survey of health and health 
behaviors conducted by state health departments in collaboration with the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. The BRFSS, which consists of repeated annual cross 
sections of randomly-sampled adults, is well suited for our analysis for several reasons. 
First, the dataset contains the necessary variables, including multiple self-reported health 
measures, demographic characteristics, and state, month, and year identifiers. Second, 
since the BRFSS spans 1984 to 2010 and included all 50 states plus the District of 
Columbia by 1995, the data cover a long enough time period to examine both post-reform 
outcomes and pre-reform trends. Third, the BRFSS contains an unusually large number 
of observations – over 2.8 million in our analysis sample of 2001 through 2010. A large 
sample is critical to obtaining meaningful precision when examining the impact of a 
state-level program with effects that might be concentrated amongst only a fraction of the 
population.  
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 Our main dependent variable is a self-reported health index asking respondents 
to rate their overall health as poor (0), fair (1), good (2), very good (3), or excellent (4). 
This index has been previously used by other studies analyzing the impact of health 
insurance on health (Card et al., 2004; Pauly, 2005; Yelowitz and Cannon, 2010) and has 
been repeatedly shown to be correlated with objective measures of health such as 
mortality (e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2010). 
According to Idler and Benyamini, another advantage of the index is that it is a global 
measure of health that captures the full range of diseases and limitations a person may 
have.  
The primary concern with the self-reported health index is its subjective nature. 
We will be able to flexibly control for the sources of reporting heterogeneity identified in 
the literature, such as age, income, and gender (Ziebarth, 2010). Nonetheless, the 
estimated effect of the reform on self-assessed health could still reflect factors beyond 
objective health.  For instance, improved access to medical care might increase awareness 
about medical conditions, causing one to self-report a lower health status after obtaining 
insurance coverage, ceteris paribus (Strauss and Thomas, 2007). In this case, the reform’s 
effect on self-assessed health would be smaller than its effect on objective health. 
Alternatively, if the peace of mind from having health insurance influences one’s answers 
to subjective health-related questions, the reform could lead to larger improvements in 
self-assessed health than objective health. 
Consequently, we also utilize a number of other health-related dependent 
variables in an attempt to verify that the results for the overall self-reported health index 
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are not driven merely by subjectivity. First, we consider number of days out of the past 
30 not in good physical health and number of days out of the past 30 not in good mental 
health. These variables are somewhat less subjective than the overall health index 
because the respondents are specifically asked to consider a particular component of 
health. Even less subjective is the next health measure: number of days out of the past 30 
with health-related functional limitations. Our last five health-related dependent variables 
– an indicator for the presence of activity-limiting joint pain, body mass index (BMI), 
minutes per week of moderate physical activity, minutes per week of vigorous physical 
activity, and an indicator for whether the individual currently smokes – are quite specific 
and therefore the least open to subjective interpretation.
20
 
21
  
We measure coverage with a binary variable reflecting whether or not the 
individual has “any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid 
plans such as HMOs, or government plans such as Medicare.” The BRFSS does not 
indicate the source of coverage or provide any information on premiums, deductibles, or 
copayments. Finally, we utilize as control variables the BRFSS’ information on age, 
marital status, race, income, education, marital status, and current pregnancy status.  
                                                        
20
 BMI=weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters.  Self-reported weight and height are 
potentially susceptible to biases. Some researchers utilize an adjustment developed by Cawley (2004) that 
predicts actual height and weight based on self-reported height and weight using the National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey, and then applies the prediction equation to other datasets that only include 
the self-reported measures.  However, studies with BMI as the dependent variable have repeatedly found 
that applying this adjustment has little influence on the results, so we do not use it here (e.g. Courtemanche 
et al., 2011).    
21
 The BRFSS gives respondents guidance for how to distinguish between moderate and vigorous physical 
activity, reducing the subjectivity of these variables.  Moderate activities include “brisk walking, bicycling, 
vacuuming, gardening, or anything else that causes small increases in breathing or heart rate.”  Vigorous 
activities include “running, aerobics, heavy yard work, or anything else that causes large increases in 
breathing or heart rate.” 
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We also include four state-level variables as controls in a robustness check. The 
first is monthly state unemployment rate, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Next, monthly state cigarette excise tax rates come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco 
(Orzechowski and Walker, 2010) and are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index for all urban consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, we use annual 
state hospital and physician data from the Census Bureau to impute monthly estimates of 
numbers of hospitals and physicians per 100,000 residents.
22
 
 Our analysis uses a ten-year window surrounding the reform, 2001 to 2010. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 compare the descriptive statistics for Massachusetts and the other 
states in the pre-treatment period of January 2001 through March 2006. Prior to the 
reform, Massachusetts was already healthier than the rest of the country along most 
dimensions and had a higher coverage rate. Massachusetts residents averaged higher 
income and more education than those in other states, and were more likely to be single 
and white. Massachusetts also had a relatively low unemployment rate, high cigarette tax, 
high physician density, and low hospital density. These baseline differences illustrate the 
difficulty in isolating the causal impact of Massachusetts’ health care reform. A naïve 
estimator using only a post-treatment cross section would attribute the entire difference in 
health between Massachusetts and other states to the reform, including the part of the 
difference that was already present prior to its enactment. Our empirical analysis will 
therefore rely on a difference-in-differences estimator that controls for pre-treatment 
differences in state health as well as a number of time-varying observable characteristics. 
                                                        
22
 Monthly estimates were calculated using the formula:              
 
  
       , where    and    
are annual estimates, and   is number of months from    to          . 
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 As a precursor to the regression analysis, Figure 2.1 plots the average values of 
the health status index in Massachusetts and the 50 control states (the other 49 states plus 
Washington, DC) every year from 2001 to 2010, along with their 95% confidence 
intervals. The graph also shows linear pre-treatment trends for Massachusetts and the 
other states, computed by regressing the mean health index on year plus a constant term. 
Consistent with the summary statistics from Table 2.2, Massachusetts residents had better 
average self-assessed health than those in the control states even before the reform. 
Despite this difference in baseline levels, the pre-treatment trends in both Massachusetts 
and the other states were both downward sloping and – critically for the validity of the 
difference-in-differences approach – almost exactly parallel. The year-to-year 
fluctuations in the control states in the pre-treatment period are estimated very precisely 
and lie almost exactly on top of the trend line, while the year-to-year fluctuations in 
Massachusetts are estimated much less precisely and deviate more substantially. This 
underscores the importance of utilizing a sufficiently long pre-treatment period in the 
regression analysis. If, for instance, 2005 – a year in which health in Massachusetts 
appears to have been below trend – was the only pre-treatment year, a difference-in-
differences estimate might capture mean reversion in addition to the causal effect.  
After the reform was passed in 2006, health in the control states remained 
relatively stable. In contrast, health in Massachusetts improved in 2006 – as the subsidies 
and Medicaid expansions took effect in the early stages of the reform’s implementation – 
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and again in 2009.
 23
 To more formally investigate whether these improvements were a 
causal response to health care reform, we next turn to regression analysis. The regression 
results will broadly support the preliminary findings from Figure 2.1, although we will 
see that in a regression context the health gains did not appear until 2007.  
 
Regression Analysis 
 
Baseline Model 
 
We estimate the impact of Massachusetts health care reform on overall self-
assessed health status using an ordered probit difference-in-differences model.
24
 Suppose 
the underlying relationship between the covariates and a latent variable representing 
health (  ) is given by 
 
     
                                        
               (2.1) 
 
where i, s, and t are indices for individual, state, and month/year combination (e.g. 
January 2001).     is a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in 
Massachusetts. Following Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we define         as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 from April 2006 to June 2007, the time period after the law had been 
passed but before all the key provisions had been implemented.        is a dummy 
                                                        
23
 Figure 2.1 may help explain the mixed results found by Yelowitz and Cannon (2010).  Their pre-
treatment years were 2005, in which health in Massachusetts was off its long-run trend line, and 2006, in 
which a causal response to the early aspects of the reform was possible.  Their only post-treatment year was 
2008, before the second spike in the health in Massachusetts residents seen in 2009. 
24 Given the strong distributional assumptions made by the ordered probit model, we also considered two 
more flexible approaches to modeling the impact of the reform on health.  The first estimates a series of 
four probits with the dependent variables being indicators for fair or better, good or better, very good or 
better, and excellent health.  The second uses the same dependent variables but estimates linear probability 
models. The conclusions reached are the same; the results are shown in Appendices A and B. 
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variable equal to 1 starting in July of 2007, when the final major component of the reform 
– the individual mandate – took effect.     
  consists of the age, marital status, race, 
income, education, and pregnancy variables listed in Table 2.3.    and    are state and 
month fixed effects, while      is the error term.  
We do not observe     
  and instead observe an ordinal health measure      such  
that 
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where    through    are constants that represent the cut-off points. An ordered probit 
regression of      on the covariates from (1) computes the following probabilities of 
being in each of the five health states:   
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where         , the cutoff points adjusted for the constant term. The coefficient of 
interest is   , which captures the difference between the change in Massachusetts from 
the “before” to the “after” period and the change in the control states from the before to 
the after period – in other words, the “difference in differences.”  
Computing treatment effects in non-linear models has been the source of 
confusion in the literature. Ai and Norton (2003) showed that the cross difference in a 
nonlinear model is different from the marginal effect on the interaction term, and could 
even be the opposite sign.  However, Puhani (2008) showed that the cross difference 
identified by Ai and Norton (2003) is not the same as the treatment effect, and that when 
the treatment effect is the parameter of interest it is appropriate to focus on the coefficient 
of the interaction term.  A similar observation has been made by Terza (2012). Following 
Puhani (2008), our “treatment effect on the treated” is given by 
 
                  [                   ]  
 [                   ]  
 
(2.6) 
where    and    are potential outcomes with and without treatment. The “average 
treatment effect on the treated” is the mean of this treatment effect across those 
individuals living in Massachusetts in the “after” period (July 2007 through December 
2009).  
Because of the nonlinearity of the model, the treatment effect depends on the 
value of the other covariates. The effects of the reform on the probabilities of being in 
each of the five health states among the treated are 
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where the state subscript   has been replaced by   for Massachusetts, and   is restricted 
to the “after” period. 
 The key identifying assumption in the difference-in-differences model is that 
            and           are uncorrelated with the error term. In other words, 
the estimates can be interpreted as causal effects of the reform if we assume that in the 
absence of the reform changes over time in health would have been the same in 
Massachusetts and the control states, conditional on the control variables. The similarity 
of Massachusetts’ pre-treatment trend in health to that of the other states shown in Figure 
2.1 provides preliminary support for this assumption. We therefore use all 50 other states 
(49 states plus the District of Columbia) as the control group in the baseline regression, 
and consider several alternatives in the Robustness Checks’ Section. 
Our standard errors in the baseline regression are heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered by state. As shown by Bertrand et al. (2004), conventional difference-in-
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differences methods can over-reject the null hypothesis because of serial correlation even 
when standard errors are clustered. We therefore use more stringent standards for 
statistical significance than usual: 0.1%, 1%, and 5% significance levels. In the Section 
Tests Related to Inference we will more formally investigate whether underestimated 
standard errors could be driving our conclusions. 
The first column of Table 2.4 reports the coefficient estimates for            
and           from the ordered probit regression, along with the average treatment 
effects on the treated in the after period.
25
 The interaction term           is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and its effect on health is positive, suggesting than 
health care reform began to improve the health of Massachusetts residents even before 
the reform was fully implemented. This is plausible since some provisions of the reform, 
such as the Medicaid expansions and subsidies for those below 100% FPL, started in 
2006. The interaction term         is significant at the 0.1% level and its coefficient 
estimate is more than twice as large as that for         . Not surprisingly, the effect 
of the reform strengthened once it was fully implemented. This could either represent the 
impact of the later components, such as the mandate, or a gradual response to the earlier 
components. The t-statistic for         is 6.5, meaning that our clustered standard 
errors would have to be underestimated by a factor of more than three for the result to be 
driven by autocorrelation. 
 The estimated average treatment effects show that the Massachusetts health care 
reform decreased the probabilities of being in poor, fair and good health and increased 
                                                        
25
 Coefficient estimates for the other covariates are available upon request. 
 
 
 
52 
the probabilities of being in very good and excellent health. The drops in the probabilities 
of being in poor, fair, and good health are 0.2, 0.5, and 0.7 percentage points, respectively, 
while the increases in the probabilities of being in very good and excellent health are 0.2 
and 1.2 percentage points.  
We next conduct two back-of-the-envelope calculations to help assess the 
economic significance of these estimates. The first consolidates the five treatment effects 
into a single measure that attempts to quantify the overall increase in health. We multiply 
each of the treatment effects by the value of the health status index associated with the 
corresponding category (0 for poor, 1 for fair, 2 for good, 3 for very good, and 4 for 
excellent), and then divide by the sample standard deviation. This result is an overall 
effect on health of 0.033 standard deviations, shown in the third-to-last row of Table 
2.4.
26
 The magnitude of the impact therefore appears modest across the entire population, 
but perhaps large amongst the small fraction of the population who experienced a change 
in coverage as a result of the reform and is likely driving the results.  
 The second calculation combines the estimated treatment effects with the 
information on the reform’s costs from the introduction to compute the annual fiscal cost 
for each adult transitioned from poor, fair, or good health to very good or excellent health. 
We do this first considering total government spending (federal and state), and then using 
only Massachusetts’ share of that spending. The former provides a more relevant 
projection for national health care reform, while the latter is more relevant for evaluations 
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 This calculation should be interpreted with caution, as it relies on the strong assumption that each 
incremental increase in the health index represents the same improvement in health. 
 
 
 
 
53 
of the Massachusetts reform. 1.4% of the adult population transitioned into very good or 
excellent health. The adult population in Massachusetts was 5,138,919 in July 2010 
according to the Census, so 1.4% translates to 71,945 individuals. Since the reform cost 
an estimated $707 million in FY2010, total government spending is an estimated $9,827 
per year for every adult whose health improves from poor, fair, or good to very good or 
excellent. Since Massachusetts splits the costs evenly with the federal government, the 
state spends approximately $4,914 annually per adult transitioned into very good or 
excellent health. These calculations are far from complete cost-effectiveness analyses, as 
they ignore costs to patients and private insurers as well as benefits from consumption 
smoothing or improvements in children’s health. They do, however, provide some 
information about the returns to government spending while underscoring the point that 
financing universal coverage at the federal level is likely to be more difficult than in 
Massachusetts, as matching money is not available.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
This section further examines the validity of the identifying assumption of 
common counterfactual health trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country 
by considering a number of alternative control groups and adding state-level covariates. 
First, we use as the control group the ten states with the most similar pre-treatment 
average health status indices to Massachusetts (“match on pre-treatment levels”). Second, 
we “match on pre-treatment trends” by running regressions of average health on year plus 
a constant term for each state from 2001-2005 and then choosing as the comparison 
group the ten states with the most similar slopes to Massachusetts. Next, we use a control 
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group of the ten states with the most similar pre-reform health insurance coverage rates 
(“match on pre-treatment coverage”).
27
 We then consider a control group consisting of 
the other New England states because of their geographic proximity to Massachusetts. An 
additional specification excludes states that passed more limited health care reforms 
during the sample period (California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon and Vermont). 
The sixth robustness check constructs a “synthetic control group” for 
Massachusetts, as described by Abadie et al. (2010). We first aggregate to the state-by-
year level and allow the data to select the combination of the other 50 states that best 
matches Massachusetts on health status and the control variables during the pre-treatment 
years 2001-2005.
28
 The resulting control group is 70.9% Connecticut, 11.3% Rhode 
Island, 8% Washington, D.C., 5.9% Utah, 3.7% California, and 0.1% Arizona. Following 
Fitzpatrick’s (2008) application of this method to individual data, we then multiply the 
weights for the individual-level observations by these shares, leaving Massachusetts fully 
weighted and dropping the 44 states that received a zero weight.
29
 
The next regression uses the rest of the country as the control group but excludes 
the year 2005. Recall from Figure 2.1 that in 2005 health in Massachusetts was below the 
                                                        
27
 When matching on pre-treatment levels, the control states are Colorado, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont and Virginia.  When 
matching on pre-treatment trends, the control states are Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey and New York.  When matching on pre-treatment coverage, the 
control states are Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Unreported regressions used control groups of five or twenty 
states instead of ten; the results were similar.   
28
 We do this using the Stata module “synth” (Abadie et al., 2011). 
29
 In the “matching on pre-treatment levels,” “matching on pre-treatment trends,” New England, and 
synthetic control regressions, the number of states is 11 or fewer. Angrist and Pischke (2008) note that 
standard errors clustered by state are unreliable when the number of states is small. As they recommend, we 
instead cluster standard errors at the state-by-year level in these four regressions.   
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trend line, raising the question of whether the improvement in health from 2005 to 2006 
could be due to a temporary negative shock in 2005 rather than the reform in 2006. The 
long pre-treatment period mitigates this concern by tempering the influence of 2005, but 
dropping 2005 addresses it more directly.
30
  
Finally, we return to the full sample but control for the potential time-varying 
state-level confounders unemployment rate, cigarette tax rate, physician density, and 
hospital density, along with linear state-specific time trends to allow for differential 
trends in health along unobservable dimensions.
31
 Controlling for unemployment rate and 
cigarette tax could be especially important given the differential impacts of the recession 
across states and the large cigarette tax increase passed in Massachusetts in 2009.  
We present the results of these robustness checks in Columns 2 through 9 of 
Table 2.4. The coefficient of the interaction term          remains positive in all 
specifications, with magnitudes ranging from 0.010 to 0.022, though it loses statistical 
significance in some of the regressions with smaller control groups. In contrast, the 
interaction term          remains highly significant in all specifications. The 
magnitude of its effect is stable, as it ranges from 0.032 to 0.049 and is always within the 
95% confidence interval from the baseline regression. As a result the treatment effects are 
also similar across specifications.  
 
                                                        
30
 Other unreported robustness checks experimented with the use of shorter pre-treatment periods beginning 
in 2002, 2003, or 2004.  The results remained very similar.  
31
 We relegate the state-level control variables to a robustness check rather than using them in the main 
analysis because of concerns that some of them – in particular unemployment rate, physician density, and 
hospital density –could be endogenous to health care reform.  Moreover, the four state-level controls are all 
individually and jointly insignificant, so the state fixed effects appear to sufficiently capture their influence 
on health.  
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Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects  
 
 This section simultaneously addresses two possible concerns with the estimates 
from Table 2.4. First, the difference-in-differences approach assumes common 
counterfactual health trends between Massachusetts and the rest of the country. The 
robustness of the estimates to different constructions of the control group is consistent 
with this assumption, but conceivably health trends in Massachusetts could be so unique 
that no appropriate comparison group of states exists. Second, the preceding regressions 
do not differentiate between the short- and long-run health effects of the reform following 
full implementation. Since health is a capital stock accumulated through repeated 
investments, the improvements in health resulting from the reform could increase over 
time. Alternatively, the long-term uninsured might experience a pent-up demand for 
medical services after obtaining coverage, in which case the entire improvement in health 
could be reached quickly or even be temporary. 
 We address these issues by re-estimating equation (2.1) with a broader set of 
interaction terms. First, we divide the ten-year sample into five two-year periods and 
include interactions of the Massachusetts dummy with indicators for 2003-2004, 2005-
2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2010 (leaving 2001-2002 as the reference period). A second 
regression interacts Massachusetts with a full set of year dummies. These models test the 
common trends assumption by testing for differential trends between Massachusetts and 
other states in the pre-treatment period 2001-2005. If the treatment and control groups 
were trending similarly before the reform, then they likely would have continued to trend 
similarly from 2006-2010 if the reform had not occurred. The models also distinguish 
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between short- and long-run effects by including multiple interactions from the post-
reform period. 
 Table 2.5 displays the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms. The 
regression with two-year splits shows that health trends in Massachusetts and other states 
were similar through the pre-treatment period, with a sizeable gap emerging in the early 
period following the reform’s full implementation (2007-2008) that grew only slightly in 
the later period (2009-2010). These results are consistent with the reform having a 
positive causal effect on health, and with the short- and long-run effects being similar. 
The results from the one-year splits are broadly similar, with the exception that 
Massachusetts experienced a temporary negative health shock in 2005 that disappeared 
by 2006. At no point in the pre-treatment period was there a Massachusetts-specific 
health shock that lasted longer than one year, making it unlikely that the sustained 
improvement in health in Massachusetts from 2007-2010 would have occurred in the 
absence of the reform. Moreover, the regression excluding 2005 from Table 2.4 provides 
further evidence that the negative shock in Massachusetts in 2005 is not meaningfully 
influencing our conclusions.
32
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 As an alternative approach to testing the common trend assumption, in Appendix C we conduct three 
falsification tests restricting the sample to the pre-treatment years 2001-2005.  The first considers 2001-
2003 to be the “before” period and 2004-2005 the “after” period, while the second treats 2001-2002 as the 
“before” period and 2003-2005 as the “after” period.  The third classifies 2001-2002 as the “before” period, 
2003 as the “during” period, and 2004-2005 as the “after” period.  None of these tests produce any 
evidence of differential pre-treatment trends between Massachusetts and the other states. 
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Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns 
 
The Massachusetts reform’s coverage expansions likely appeal to individuals with 
pre-existing conditions or a higher probability of facing future illness. This section 
therefore addresses another possible concern: that Massachusetts attracted sicker 
residents after the reform, either by making them less likely to leave the state or more 
likely to move there. If this is the case, our estimates may understate the reform’s true 
effect on health, as the positive causal effect would be tempered by negative selection.  
We test for endogenous moving patterns by examining whether the demographic 
and financial profile of Massachusetts residents changed following the reform in a way 
that would suggest a change in the underlying propensity towards health of the state’s 
population. We first conduct a linear regression of health status index on the individual-
level control variables among the pre-treatment portion of the sample, using the 
coefficient estimates to predict health for the entire sample. We then estimate the 
influence of             and           , along with the state and time fixed 
effects, on predicted health status. Table 2.6 reports the results. The coefficient estimates 
for the interaction terms are both negative, consistent with Massachusetts health care 
reform attracting sick individuals, but the effects are small and insignificant at the 5% 
level. It therefore seems unlikely that endogenous moving patters are meaningfully 
attenuating the estimated impact of the reform on health. 
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Tests Related to Inference 
 
 This section conducts tests to help rule out the possibility that the statistical 
significance observed in the baseline regression is merely an artifact of underestimated 
standard errors. First, following Bertrand et al.’s (2004) suggestion, we compress all the 
available data into a state-level panel with three time periods – “before”, “during”, and 
“after” – and regress state average health index on           ,          , and 
state and time period fixed effects. Next, we compress the data into only two cross-
sectional units – Massachusetts and other states – and ten years, defining 2006 and 2007 
as the “during” period and 2008 to 2010 as the “after” period. We then regress average 
health index on           ,          , a Massachusetts dummy, and year fixed 
effects. As shown in Table 2.7,            remains statistically significant in both 
regressions despite the small sample, and the effect sizes in standard deviations (of the 
individual-level health index) are similar to those from Table 2.4.  
 In the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010), we also consider a different approach to 
inference and ask how likely it would be to estimate similarly large health improvements 
simply by picking any state at random. We re-estimate the baseline ordered probit 
regression with each of the other 50 states as the “treated” unit. Only two states – Oregon 
and Florida – had larger positive “treatment effects” than Massachusetts. The probability 
of obtaining as large a health improvement as that estimated for Massachusetts by chance 
is therefore 4%, below the standard 5% significance level.
33
 Moreover, the result for 
                                                        
33
 We do not report the full set of results for all 50 states due to space considerations; they are available 
upon request. 
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Oregon could potentially be explained by the 2008 Medicaid expansion shown to 
improve self-assessed health by Finkelstein et al. (2011).             
 
Other Health Outcomes 
 
 This section moves beyond the overall health index and explores the effect of 
the reform on a variety of additional health outcomes: number of days out of the past 30 
not in good physical health, not in good mental health, and with health-related functional 
limitations; activity-limiting joint pain; BMI; minutes per week of moderate physical 
activity and vigorous physical activity; and smoking status. These variables were chosen 
because they satisfy two conditions: 1) they are strongly and significantly correlated with 
the overall health index in the expected direction (as shown in Appendix D), and 2) they 
do not rely on a doctor’s diagnosis, since a diagnosis requires medical access which is 
endogenous to the reform.
34
  
Analyzing health outcomes beyond the overall self-assessed health index serves 
three purposes. First, verifying that we also observe improvements in health using a wide 
range of more specific (and therefore less subjective) questions increases our confidence 
that the reform did in fact improve objective – and not merely subjective – health. Second, 
examining additional outcomes sheds light on the mechanisms through which this effect 
occurred. For instance, obtaining health insurance can improve physical (or mental) 
health through increased utilization of medical services, mental health through lower 
                                                        
34
 The first condition excludes, for instance, alcoholic drinks per month, which is only weakly correlated 
with health and in the opposite of the expected direction.  The second condition excludes BRFSS questions 
that ask whether a respondent has ever been diagnosed with a particular chronic condition, such as diabetes 
and asthma. 
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stress from reduced financial risk, or health behaviors through expanded access to advice 
and information. Third, including the health behavior-related variables BMI and smoking 
tests a separate prediction of economic theory: reduced financial vulnerability to health 
shocks from insurance coverage could cause people to take more health risks, a 
phenomenon known as “ex ante moral hazard” (e.g. Dave and Kaestner, 2009; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2011).  
Days not in good physical and mental health, days with health-related limitations, 
and minutes of moderate and vigorous exercise per week are non-negative count 
variables with variances higher than the means. We therefore estimate negative binomial 
models for these outcomes. The conditional expectation is given by 
 
  [             ]       (2.11) 
 
 
where     is the number of days or minutes,   is the over-dispersion coefficient, and   
is defined by  
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The treatment effect on the treated is defined as 
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while the average treatment effect on the treated is the mean of   among Massachusetts 
residents in the “after” period. 
 For the binary outcome variables (activity-limiting joint pain and smoking 
status), we estimate probit models of the form 
 
           
                                          
          
 
 
(2.14) 
with the treatment effect on the treated being 
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(2.15) 
Body mass index is continuous, so we estimate a linear regression in which the treatment 
effect is simply the coefficient estimate for          .  
Some of the health-related questions were not asked in Massachusetts in certain 
years, necessitating restrictions to the sample. Activity-limiting joint pain and the two 
measures of exercise are only available in odd-numbered survey years, meaning that the 
“during” period spans only six months (January 2007 to June 2007). We therefore 
combine those six months with the rest of 2007 and 2009 and classify the two years as 
the “after” period, dropping the             interaction from those regressions. 
Additionally, the physical health, mental health, and health limitations variables are not 
available in 2002.    
                                                        
35
 We include cigarette tax as an additional covariate in the smoking regression. 
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Table 2.8 presents the results using the full control group of 50 states.
36
 Health 
care reform in Massachusetts is associated with reductions in the number of days not in 
good physical health, not in good mental health, and with health-related functional 
limitations, as well as a lower probability of having activity-limiting joint pain. The 
magnitudes of these reductions range from 0.018 to 0.033 standard deviations, roughly 
similar to the size of the effect for the overall health status index. It therefore seems 
unlikely that the observed effect on the health index is driven purely by the subjectivity 
of the question. Moreover, these results suggest that the reform improved health more 
broadly than merely by reducing stress from lower financial risk. 
Turning to the health-behavior related variables, the reform is associated with a 
0.025 standard deviation reduction in BMI and a 0.036 standard deviation increase in 
moderate exercise, but no statistically detectable effect on vigorous exercise or smoking. 
These results suggest that expanded access to primary care improves at least some health 
behaviors, perhaps through information or accountability. The increase in moderate but 
not vigorous exercise is consistent with physician advice encouraging sedentary 
individuals to begin a light exercise routine, rather than encouraging those who are 
already active to increase or intensity their activity. The non-effect on smoking is 
consistent with evidence that smoking habits respond only gradually to external factors 
(e.g. Courtemanche, 2009), but could also reflect the health consequences of smoking 
already being widely-known even without physician access. Importantly, none of the 
                                                        
36
 To conserve space, we do not present the results from the full range of specifications from Table 2.4 for 
these other health outcomes.  Unreported regressions verify that the conclusions reached are not driven by 
the choice of control group. 
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regressions provide any evidence of ex-ante moral hazard causing individuals to take 
more health risks after obtaining insurance. 
The final column of Table 2.8 presents the results using as the dependent variable 
a “cardinalized overall health status index” equal to the predicted outcome from a 
regression of the health index on the six most plausibly objective health outcomes: 
functional limitations, joint pain, BMI, moderate exercise, vigorous exercise, and 
smoking (       ).37 This approach is advocated by Ziebarth et al. (2010) and others 
as a way to handle reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed health. The impact of 
           remain positive and significant, and the effect size in standard deviations is 
similar to those from Table 2.4. This provides further evidence that our conclusions are 
not merely driven by subjectivity.         
 
Heterogeneity 
 
 We next return to the actual overall health status index and examine 
heterogeneity in the effect of Massachusetts health care reform on the bases of gender, 
age, race, and income. Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) found the largest coverage 
expansions among men, young adults, minorities, and those with low incomes. However, 
different effects on coverage do not necessarily translate to different effects on health, as 
the impacts of coverage on health could also be heterogeneous. We consider the 
following subsamples: women; men; ages 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and 
older; whites; blacks; Hispanics; other race; and household incomes below $25,000, 
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 We also considered dropping health limitations from the set of variables used to make the prediction, or 
using all eight alternate health outcomes to make the prediction. The results were virtually identical. 
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between $25,000 and $75,000, and above $75,000. We choose these income splits in 
order to loosely align with the provisions of the reform, which specify that health 
insurance be free up to 150% FPL ($23,050 for a family of four) and subsidized up to 
300% ($69,150 for a family of four).
38
 We estimate the baseline ordered probit model for 
all subsamples, with one exception. The baseline model gives an implausibly large 
magnitude for the 75 and older subsample, which upon further investigation appears to be 
driven by differential pre-treatment trends between Massachusetts and non-Massachusetts 
residents of that age group. We therefore include linear state-specific trends for that 
subsample.
39
  
 Table 2.9 reports the results for the gender and age subsamples. The impact on 
health is positive and significant for both women and men but stronger for women. 
Stratifying by age, the effect is largest among the near-elderly aged 55-64, second largest 
among those 45-54, smaller among the two groups below 45, and smaller still among the 
two elderly groups. Our finding that the effect of the reform diminishes dramatically at 
age 65 is not surprising since individuals eligible for Medicare cannot purchase insurance 
through the Connector (Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 2006). It is interesting, 
though, that we still observe some evidence of health improvements among the elderly 
despite Medicare. Only those seniors who have paid Medicare taxes for at least ten years 
(or whose spouse has done so) are eligible for free Medicare Part A (Johnson-Lans, 2005), 
                                                        
38
 2012 federal poverty lines are available at coverageforall.org/pdf/FHCE_FedPovertyLevel.pdf, accessed 
6/26/12. Since the BRFSS only reports income categories and lacks comprehensive information about 
household size, lining up the categories to exactly match 150% and 300% of the poverty line is not possible. 
39 Recall that differential pre-treatment trends did not appear to be an issue for the full sample, and 
including state-specific trends for the full sample did not meaningfully affect the results. This suggests that 
the baseline estimator without state trends is still appropriate for the full sample, even if it is not for the 75 
and over age group.    
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and presumably those seniors ineligible for Medicare could purchase community-rated 
insurance through the Connector. Indeed, in our data the reform increases the coverage 
rate of the elderly by a statistically significant 0.3 percentage points, an effect similar to 
that found by Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) using the National Inpatient Sample. 
Moreover, seniors could be affected by system-wide changes in the delivery of health 
care following the reform, such as reduced crowds in emergency rooms or the 
improvements in some dimensions of quality of care noted by Kolstad and Kowalski 
(2010).  
 Table 2.10 stratifies by race and income. Chapter 58 improved health across all 
racial subgroups, but the effect was largest for blacks and those of a race besides white, 
black, or Hispanic. A back-of-the-envelope calculation provides a ballpark estimate of 
the extent to which the reform reduced the health disparity between blacks and whites. In 
Massachusetts in the “before” period, the mean health status indices of blacks and whites 
were 2.553 and 2.786, respectively, for a difference of 0.233. The treatment effects imply 
changes in the health status indices of blacks and whites of 0.091 and 0.036, for a 
difference of 0.055. We therefore estimate that the reform reduced black-white health 
disparities by 23.6%. Stratifying by income, the reform improved the health of all three 
income groups but had the largest effect amongst those with incomes below $25,000 for 
whom insurance premiums are heavily or fully subsidized. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
 We close the empirical analysis by using            and           as 
instruments to estimate the impact of having insurance coverage on health. This 
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instrumental variables approach requires stricter assumptions than the reduced-form 
model, as the reform must only impact health along the extensive margin of insurance 
coverage, conditional on the controls. This assumption would be violated if the reform 
also influenced health through the intensive margin of coverage, for instance by causing 
some individuals to switch from high-deductible catastrophic coverage to more 
comprehensive coverage available through the Connector. This assumption would also be 
violated if the reform affected the health of those who did not switch insurance plans 
through system-wide changes to health care delivery or peer effects. Despite these 
caveats, the instrumental variables analysis is useful because it estimates the magnitude 
of the impact of insurance on health that would be necessary for the extensive margin to 
be the only channel through which the reform influenced health. If the magnitude is 
implausibly large, then other mechanisms must play a role as well. Since the assumption 
that the entire effect on health occurs through the extensive margin of coverage is 
unlikely to hold for Medicare beneficiaries, we exclude seniors from the analysis in this 
section. 
 The first stage predicts insurance coverage using the following linear probability 
model: 
 
                                              
       
         
 
 
(2.16) 
where     is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person reported having any health 
insurance coverage. Because of the non-linearity of the second stage, we utilize a two-
stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach in which the residual from the first-stage 
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regression is included as an additional regressor in the second stage. Terza et al. (2008) 
show that in non-linear contexts 2SRI gives consistent coefficient estimates, while 
traditional two stage least squares does not. The second stage is modeled as an ordered 
probit and the probabilities of being in each of the five health states are given by, 
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where  ̂    is the first-stage residual. The effect of health insurance on the probability of 
being in health state   is 
 
 
                                               (2.20) 
 
 
  
The asymptotic standard errors of these probabilities and the standard errors for the 
second stage estimates were calculated following Terza (2011).
40
 Equation (2.19) 
represents the “local average treatment effect” of insurance among those who obtained 
coverage as a result of the reform, and is subject to the usual caveat regarding 
generalizability.  
 Table 2.11 reports the coefficient estimates of interest from the first and second 
stage regressions for the full sample, along with the estimated impacts of insurance on the 
                                                        
40
 Mata code is available upon request.  
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health state probabilities. The first stage estimates an increase in the coverage rate of 1.9 
percentage points in the “during” period and 5.4 percentage points in the “after” period. 
The F statistic from a test of the joint significance of            and           
is large, suggesting the instruments are sufficiently strong. Turning to the second stage, 
obtaining insurance leads to a positive and statistically significant improvement in health. 
The first-stage residual is significant and negatively associated with health, providing 
evidence that an OLS estimator would suffer from a downward bias. Insurance is 
estimated to reduce the probabilities of being in poor, fair, and good health by 6.2, 9.8, 
and 8.5 percentage points, while increasing the probabilities of being in very good and 
excellent health by 8.5 and 16 percentage points. The overall effect of insurance on the 
health status index, encompassing changes in all five probabilities, is 0.585 of the sample 
standard deviation. 
 These effects are strikingly large, but assessing their plausibility requires a 
comparison to other estimates from the literature. Finkelstein et al. (2011) employ the 
cleanest research design to date among studies of the impact of insurance on self-assessed 
health: a randomized intervention in Oregon granting Medicaid eligibility to a subset of 
the uninsured. They estimate that Medicaid enrollment increases the probability of being 
in good, very good, or excellent health by 13.3 percentage points. The sum of our 
estimated effects on the probabilities of being in those three health states is a similar 16 
percentage points. The results from the two papers are not directly comparable given the 
differences in populations, but this similarity suggests that it is conceivable that the 
reform’s entire effect on the self-assessed health of the non-elderly could have occurred 
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through the extensive margin of coverage. Future research should more directly 
investigate the roles of other potential channels. 
 We also conduct instrumental variables analyses for the gender, race, age, and 
income subgroups, allowing us to assess whether the heterogeneity in the reform’s effect 
on health observed in the Heterogeneity Section comes from heterogeneity in the effect 
on coverage or the effect of coverage. Appendices E and F report the results. The 
coverage expansions are larger for men than women, but women have greater health 
gains from coverage, explaining the greater net effect of the reform for women. Among 
the age subsamples, those under 35 years old have the largest gains in coverage, but also 
the smallest health improvements from obtaining coverage. Of the non-elderly age groups, 
55-64 year olds have the smallest effect of the reform on coverage but the largest effect 
of coverage on health. Stratifying by race shows that coverage rates increase the most for 
non-black minorities but that the health effects of coverage are the largest for blacks. 
Finally, the coverage expansions are the largest for the low-income group, second largest 
for the middle-income group, and smallest for those with high incomes. However, the 
effect of coverage on health is the strongest for the high income group.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the effect of health care reform in Massachusetts on self-
assessed health using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). 
An ordered probit difference-in-differences analysis showed that the reform increased the 
probability of individuals reporting excellent or very good health while reducing their 
probability of reporting good, fair, or poor health. These results were robust to alternative 
 
 
 
71 
constructions of the control group and the addition of state-level covariates. We did not 
find evidence that the estimates were meaningfully impacted by differential pre-treatment 
trends or endogenous moving patterns. Next, we examined a number of more specific 
health outcomes and found improvements in physical health, mental health, functional 
limitations, joint disorders, body mass index, and moderate physical activity. Testing for 
heterogeneity revealed that women, minorities, near-elderly adults, and those with 
incomes low enough to qualify for the law’s subsidies experienced the largest gains in 
health as a result of the reform. Finally, we embedded the reform in an instrumental 
variables framework and estimated a large positive impact of obtaining health insurance 
on health.  
Perhaps the clearest limitation of our analysis is that all our health outcomes were 
self-reported. Our finding of similar results across a range of health outcomes with 
varying degrees of subjectivity increases our confidence that our findings largely 
represent “real” changes in physical/mental health. However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that some of the observed improvement in health could merely be due to a 
“warm glow” from acquiring health insurance. To underscore this point, recall that our 
estimated effects of insurance on self-assessed health are a similar magnitude to those of 
Finkelstein et al. (2011), and they found that a sizeable portion of the reported health 
improvements following the Oregon experiment occurred prior to measurable changes in 
overall health care utilization. Obtaining insurance coverage can reduce stress, which can 
directly improve numerous aspects of health even without any additional medical care 
 
 
 
72 
being utilized, but Finkelstein et al. (2011) do raise the question of what the estimated 
improvements in self-assessed health are capturing.  
We argue that Finkelstein et al.’s (2011) finding regarding timing does not 
automatically apply to our context for several reasons. First, their data only tracked 
individuals for a year after the intervention, while we have 4½ years of data after first of 
the newly-insured in Massachusetts obtained coverage and 3½ years after all major facets 
of the reform took effect. If a “warm glow” from acquiring insurance was driving the 
effect, we would have expected the reported health benefits from the reform to diminish 
over time, but as Table 2.5 shows this was not the case. Second, other studies have 
documented changes in health care utilization in Massachusetts at around the same time 
as we observed health improvements (Kowalski and Kolstand, 2010; Miller, 2011a). Next, 
the newly insured in the Oregon experiment were winners of a random lottery, which 
could lead to a stronger “warm glow” than simply acquiring health insurance from a 
statewide intervention like the reform in Massachusetts. Accordingly, we consistently 
find that the effects on health were small at best in the “during” period, which includes 
nine months after those with incomes below 100% FPL became eligible for free coverage. 
We therefore do not seem to observe the immediate spike in self-assessed health seen in 
the Oregon experiment. Nonetheless, as the necessary data become available it will be 
important to evaluate the impact of the Massachusetts reform on unambiguously 
objective measures of health such as mortality.           
Another natural question is the degree to which our results from Massachusetts 
can serve as projections for the Affordable Care Act. The general strategies for obtaining 
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nearly universal coverage in both the Massachusetts and federal laws involved the same 
three-pronged approach of non-group insurance market reforms, subsidies, and mandates, 
suggesting that the health effects should be broadly similar. However, the federal 
legislation included additional cost-cutting measures such as Medicare cuts that could 
potentially mitigate the gains in health from the coverage expansions. On the other hand, 
baseline uninsured rates were unusually low in Massachusetts, so the coverage 
expansions – and corresponding health improvements – from the Affordable Care Act 
could potentially be greater. Of course, larger coverage expansions may mean higher 
costs, and costs should be weighed against benefits when evaluating the welfare 
implications of reform. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Changes in Health Status Index 2001-2010 
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Table 2.1 – Similarities and Differences between the Massachusetts Reform and the National Reform (ACA) 
 
 
Domain  Massachusetts reform National reform (ACA) 
Modification of existing insurance markets 
 - No pre-existing condition exclusions (since 1996). 
- Community rated premiums that can only vary by age 
and smoking status (in place since 1996). 
- No pre-existing condition exclusions. 
- Community rated premiums that can only vary by age 
and smoking status. 
 - Minimum standards for policies, including essential 
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures. 
- Minimum standards for policies, including essential 
benefits and maximum out of pocket expenditures. 
 - Creation of a state health insurance exchange where 
insurance companies compete to offer three regulated 
levels of coverage to small employers and individuals. 
- Young adults must be allowed coverage on their 
parents’ plans for up to two years after they are no 
longer dependents or until their 26
th
 birthday. 
- States must create a health insurance exchange where 
insurance companies compete to offer four regulated 
levels of coverage to small employers and individuals. 
States are able to join multistate exchanges. 
- Young adults must be allowed coverage on their 
parents’ plans until their 26
th
 birthday. 
Mandates - Individuals are required to purchase coverage if 
affordable, (based on income and family size) or pay a 
penalty of no more than 50% of the insurance premium 
of the lowest-cost insurance exchange plan for which 
they are eligible.  
- Individuals are required to purchase coverage if it costs 
no more than 8% of income, or pay a penalty of the 
greater of 2.5 percent of taxable income or $695. 
 - Employers with more than 10 full time employees 
(FTE) are required to offer policies with minimum 
standard or pay a penalty of up to $295 annually per 
FTE.  
- Employers with 50 employees or more are required to 
offer policies with minimum standard or pay penalties 
that range from $2,000-$3,000 per FTE. 
Medicaid expansions and subsidies  
 - Medicaid expansions for children with household 
incomes up to 300% of the poverty line (FPL), for 
long-term unemployed up to 100% FPL, and for 
people with HIV up to 200% FPL. 
- Free coverage for all adults below 150% FPL. Sliding 
scale of subsidies for adults up to 300% FPL. 
- Medicaid expansions to all individuals with incomes 
below 133% FPL. 
- Sliding scale of tax credits for people up to 400% FPL. 
- Tax credits for employers with 25 or fewer employees 
and average annual wages less than $50,000 for 
offering coverage. 
Financing - Redirection of federal funding to safety net providers. 
- Redirection of the state uncompensated care pool, a 
mechanism through which hospitals were able to bill 
- Reduction of Medicare reimbursements. 
- Increase in the Medicare payroll tax and extension of 
this tax to capital income for singles (families) with 
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the state the cost of treating low-income patients. 
- Individual and employer penalties.  
- One-time assessment to health care providers and 
insurers. 
- Since 2009, a $1 per pack cigarette tax.  
incomes more than $200,000 ($250,000). 
- Individual and employer penalties. 
- Taxes on insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and 
medical device manufactures. 
- Excise taxes on high-cost insurance plans (“Cadillac 
tax”).  
Sources: Gruber (2011a, 2008b) and Harrington (2010). 
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Table 2.2 – Pre-Treatment Means of Health Variables 
 
 
Variable MA 
(n=35,990) 
Other States 
(n=1,177,056) 
Difference 
Any health insurance coverage 0.911 0.848 -0.063*** 
Overall health; 0 (poor) to 4 (excellent) 2.743 2.575 0.168*** 
Poor health 0.030 0.041 -0.011*** 
Fair health 0.089 0.112 -0.023*** 
Good health 0.261 0.294 -0.034*** 
Very good health 0.351 0.336 0.015*** 
Excellent health 0.270 0.212 0.054*** 
Days not in good physical health (of last 30)
++
 3.271 3.479 -0.207*** 
Days not in good mental health (of last 30)
++
 3.307 3.437 -0.130* 
Days with health limitations (of last 30)
++
 1.916 2.080 -0.164*** 
Activity-limiting joint problems
+
 0.123 0.133 -0.009** 
Body mass index 26.319 26.992 -0.673*** 
Minutes of moderate exercise per day
+
 57.658 58.788 -1.130 
Minutes of vigorous exercise per day
+
 40.065 38.830 1.235 
Currently smokes cigarettes 0.192 0.224 -0.032*** 
Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 
1% level; * 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. + indicates variable 
from only odd-numbered survey years. ++ indicates variable from all years except 2002. Standard errors 
are available on request. 
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Table 2.3 – Pre-Treatment Means of Control Variables 
 
 
Variable Massachusetts 
(n=35,990) 
Other States 
(n=1,177,056) 
Difference 
Age 18 to 24 0.114 0.121 -0.007* 
Age 25 to 29 0.083 0.089 -0.006** 
Age 30 to 34 0.107 0.105 0.002 
Age 35 to 39 0.105 0.104 0.001 
Age 40 to 44 0.116 0.112 0.004 
Age 45 to 49 0.100 0.101 -0.001 
Age 50 to 54 0.089 0.091 -0.003 
Age 55 to 59 0.073 0.073 0.000 
Age 60 to 64 0.056 0.056 0.000 
Age 65 to 69 0.045 0.047 -0.002 
Age 70 to 74 0.038 0.040 0.002 
Age 75 to 79 0.039 0.034 0.005*** 
Age 80 or older 0.035 0.030 0.005*** 
Female 0.510 0.502 0.008* 
Married 0.571 0.598 -0.028*** 
Race is non-Hispanic white 0.846 0.709 0.137*** 
Race is non-Hispanic black 0.034 0.098 -0.063*** 
Race is Hispanic 0.113 0.178 -0.065*** 
Race is neither black nor white nor Hispanic 0.006 0.015 -0.009*** 
Income less than $10,000 0.037 0.055 -0.018*** 
Income $10,000 to $15,000 0.039 0.056 -0.017*** 
Income $15,000 to $20,000 0.057 0.079 -0.022*** 
Income $20,000 to $25,000 0.077 0.096 -0.019*** 
Income $25,000 to $35,000 0.108 0.139 -0.031*** 
Income $35,000 to $50,000 0.149 0.172 -0.023*** 
Income $50,000 to $75,000 0.188 0.174 0.014*** 
Income $75,000 or more 0.345 0.228 0.117*** 
Less than a high school degree 0.071 0.114 -0.043*** 
High school degree but no college 0.251 0.299 -0.048*** 
Some college but not four-year degree 0.242 0.273 -0.031*** 
College graduate 0.436 0.314 0.121*** 
Currently pregnant 0.011 0.012 -0.001 
State unemployment rate 4.979 5.435 -0.456*** 
State cigarette tax (20010 $) 1.485 0.820 0.665*** 
State physician density (per 10,000 residents) 436.247 256.945 179.302*** 
State hospital density (per 10,000 residents) 1.208 1.701 -0.493*** 
Notes: *** indicates difference between Massachusetts and other states is significant at the 0.1% level; ** 
1% level; * 5% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. Standard errors are 
available on request. 
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Table 2.4 – Difference-in-Differences Ordered Probit Regressions 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 Full 
Sample 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Level 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Trend 
Match on 
Pre-Tx. 
Coverage 
New 
England 
Drop CA, 
HI, ME, 
OR, VT 
Synthetic 
Control 
Group 
Drop 2005 Add State 
Controls/ 
Trends 
 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest 
          
MA*Du-
ring 
0.017 
(0.006)** 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.007)*** 
0.013 
(0.007)* 
0.010 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.010)* 
MA*After 
0.039 
(0.006)*** 
0.049 
(0.010)*** 
0.037 
(0.008)*** 
0.046 
(0.010)*** 
0.049 
(0.007)*** 
0.038 
(0.006)*** 
0.044 
(0.008)*** 
0.032 
(0.007)*** 
0.049 
(0.010)*** 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated (After Period) 
P(Poor) 
-0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0006)*** 
P(Fair) 
-0.005 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
P(Good) 
-0.007 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
-0.008 
(0.001)*** 
-0.007 
(0.001)*** 
-0.007 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.008 
(0.002)*** 
P(Very 
Good) 
0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
0.001 
(0.0003)*** 
0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
P(Excel-
lent) 
0.012 
(0.002)*** 
0.014 
(0.003)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.013 
(0.003)*** 
0.014 
(0.002)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.013 
(0.002)*** 
0.010 
(0.002)*** 
0.015 
(0.003)*** 
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Overall 
Effect in 
Std.Dev. 
0.033 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.032 0.037 0.027 0.041 
#Control 
States 
50 10 10 10 5 45 6 50 50 
Obs. 2,879,296 633,979 643,302 578,530 340,592 2,664,194 390,453 2,582,055 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. In columns 2-5 and 7, standard errors are clustered at the 
state*year level rather than state because of the small number of states.  *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. 
All regressions include the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.   
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Table 2.5 – Testing for Differential Pre-Treatment Trends and Delayed Effects  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 2-Year Splits 1-Year Splits 
MA*2003 to 2004 
0.004 
(0.007) -- 
MA*2005 to 2006 
-0.014 
(0.007) -- 
MA*2007 to 2008 
0.032 
(0.005)*** -- 
MA*2009 to 2010 
0.039 
(0.007)*** -- 
MA*2002 -- 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
MA*2003 -- 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
MA*2004 -- 
0.010 
(0.008) 
MA*2005 -- 
-0.039 
(0.007)*** 
MA*2006 -- 
-0.0009 
(0.009) 
MA*2007 -- 
0.026 
(0.008)** 
MA*2008 -- 
0.024 
(0.008)*** 
MA*2009 -- 
0.036 
(0.010)*** 
MA*2010 -- 
0.028 
(0.009)** 
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are available upon request. 
Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state,  are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level;  * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-
level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group 
consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table 2.6 – Testing for Endogenous Moving Patterns 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Predicted Health Status 
 Coefficient 
Estimates 
MA*During 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
MA*After 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
Effect in Standard Deviations (After Period) -0.016 
Observations 2,888,559 
Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because the model is linear. Standard 
errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The regression includes state fixed effects, and fixed 
effects for each month in each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table 2.7 – Regressions with Aggregated Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Average Health Status 
 State-Level with 
Three Time Periods 
 
Annual with Two 
Cross-Sectional 
Units (MA and 
not MA) 
MA*During 
0.011 
(0.006) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
   
MA*After 
0.029 
(0.005)*** 
0.032 
(0.014)* 
   
Effect in Standard Deviations (After 
Period) 
0.027 0.030 
   
Observations 153 20 
Notes: The coefficient estimates are equal to the treatment effects because the model is linear. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by state in the first column) are in parentheses. *** 
indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. The first regression includes 
state fixed effects and dummies for the during and after periods; the second regression includes year fixed 
effects and a dummy for MA. The control group consists of all 50 other states in the first regression, and 
one group consisting of all individuals from the 50 other states in the second regression. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights when aggregating. 
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Table 2.8 – Regression Results for Other Health Outcomes 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Days not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health 
Limit-
ations 
Activity-
Limiting 
Joint Pain 
BMI Minutes 
of 
Moderate 
Exercise 
Minutes 
of 
Vigorous 
Exercise 
Smoker Cardinal-
ized 
Overall 
Health 
MA*After 
-0.079 
(0.011)*** 
-0.051 
(0.012)*** 
-0.065 
(0.013)*** 
-0.036 
(0.010)*** 
-0.143 
(0.047)** 
0.039 
(0.018)** 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
ATE on 
Treated 
-0.255 
(0.037)*** 
-0.165 
(0.041)*** 
-0.128 
(0.028)*** 
-0.006 
(0.002)*** 
-0.143 
(0.047)**
+
 
2.026 
(0.912)* 
-0.079 
(0.608) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.013 
(0.004)***
+
 
Effect in Std. 
Deviations 
-0.033 -0.022 -0.022 -0.018 -0.025 0.036 -0.001 0.002 0.027 
Observations 
2,642,88
5 
2,649,994 2,663,473 1,333,179 2,794,388 1,217,299 1,217,299 2,878,751 1,122,083 
Notes: + indicates the treatment effect and coefficient estimate are equal because the model is linear. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the 
individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. MA*During is also included for all outcomes except 
joint pain, exercise, and cadrinalized health, which are not available in odd-numbered survey years. The control group consists of all 50 other states. 
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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Table 2.9 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Gender and Age 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 Gender Age 
 
Women Men 18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
MA*After 
0.046 
(0.006)*** 
0.029 
(0.006)*** 
0.023 
(0.010)* 
0.021 
(0.008)** 
0.036 
(0.007)*** 
0.060 
(0.011)*** 
0.019 
(0.006)** 
0.015 
(0.020) 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated 
     
 
   P(Poor) 
-0.003 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0002)* 
-0.0007 
(0.0002)** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.005 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
   P(Fair) 
-0.005 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0009)* 
-0.002 
(0.0008)** 
-0.004 
(0.0008)*** 
-0.008 
(0.001)*** 
-0.003 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
   P(Good)  
-0.008 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)* 
-0.004 
(0.002)** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.0007 
(0.0009) 
   P(Very Good) 
0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
0.001 
(0.0003)*** 
0.0001 
(-0.0001) 
0.00005 
(-0.0001) 
0.0009 
(0.0002)*** 
0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
0.002 
(0.0007)*** 
0.003 
(0.004) 
   P(Excellent) 
0.014 
(0.002)*** 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
0.007 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.017 
(0.003)*** 
0.005 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Overall Effect in 
Std. Dev. 
0.039 0.024 0.022 0.018 0.029 0.049 0.017 0.015 
Observations 1,733,131 1,146,165 485,376 512,575 614,489 563,405 398,264 305,187 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 
1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in 
each year. For reasons discussed in the text, the 75+ regression also includes state-specific linear trends. The control group consists of all 50 other states. 
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.   
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Table 2.10 – Heterogeneity in the Effect on Health by Race and Income 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
  Race Household Income 
  White Black Hispanic Other <$25,000 
$25,000-
$75,000 
>$75,000 
MA*After 
0.036 
(0.005)*** 
0.091 
(0.012)*** 
0.041 
(0.016)* 
0.081 
(0.021)*** 
0.061 
(0.007)*** 
0.033 
(0.007)*** 
0.021 
(0.008)** 
Average Treatment Effects on Treated 
  
  
  
   P(Poor) 
-0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.003 
(0.001)* 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.009 
(0.001)*** 
-0.002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0001)*** 
   P(Fair) 
-0.004 
(0.0005)*** 
-0.013 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.011 
(0.001)*** 
-0.004 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0006)*** 
   P(Good) 
-0.006 
(0.0009)*** 
-0.013 
(0.002)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.006 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005 
(0.002)* 
   P(Very Good) 
0.001 
(0.0002)*** 
0.008 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.001)* 
0.009 
(0.003)*** 
0.009 
(0.001)*** 
0.003 
(0.0007)*** 
-0.001 
(0.0004)*** 
   P(Excellent) 
0.011 
(0.001)*** 
0.024 
(0.003)*** 
0.011 
(0.004)** 
0.020 
(0.005)*** 
0.012 
(0.001)*** 
0.009 
(0.002)*** 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
Overall Effect in Std. Dev. 0.030 0.078 0.033 0.07 0.055 0.029 0.020 
Observations 2,320,271 222,581 287,895 48,549 842,088 1,346,946 690,262 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 
1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in 
each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.  
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Table 2.11 – Instrumental Variables 
 
 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates  
   MA*During 
0.019 
(0.002)*** 
   MA*After 
0.054 
(0.003)*** 
1
st
 Stage F Statistic 171.42 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates  
   Insurance 
0.688 
(0.112)*** 
   1
st
 Stage Residual 
-0.663 
(0.112)*** 
Local Average Treatment Effects 
   P(Poor) 
-0.062 
(0.011)*** 
   P(Fair) 
-0.098 
(0.015)*** 
   P(Good) 
-0.085 
(0.013)*** 
   P(Very Good) 
0.085 
(0.013)*** 
   P(Excellent) 
0.16 
(0.026)*** 
Overall Effect in Standard Deviations 0.585 
Observations 2,172,797 
Notes: A linear probability model is estimated in the first stage so the coefficient estimate equals the 
treatment effect. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. 
***Indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include 
MA*During, the individual-level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in 
each year. The control group consists of all 50 other states.  Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FOOD ASSISTANCE AND FAMILY ROUTINES IN THREE AMERICAN CITIES 
 
 
(Co-authored with David Ribar) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the National School Lunch 
Program, the School Breakfast Program, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program 
for Women, Infants, and Children all share the fundamental goal of helping needy and 
vulnerable people in the U.S. obtain access to nutritious foods that they might not 
otherwise be able to afford. However, the programs also have other objectives, such as 
improving recipients’ health, reducing household food insecurity, and furthering 
children’s development and school performance. To investigate these broader impacts, 
we examine the relationship between participation in public and private food assistance 
programs and a number of family processes, including family routines (including shared 
meals) and time use. We examine these relationships using the data from the Three-City 
Study, a longitudinal survey of low-income families with children to estimate 
multivariate longitudinal regression models that incorporate fixed effects controls that 
account for unobservable characteristics. Estimates from these models indicate that 
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SNAP participation is negatively associated with homework routines. WIC participation 
on the other hand, is positively associated with family routines in general and with dinner  
do not yield statistically significant associations between school meals and family 
routines.  
 
Introduction 
 
The major food assistance programs in the United States—the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), the 
School Breakfast Program (SBP), and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)—all share the fundamental goal of helping needy 
families and individuals obtain access to nutritious foods that they might not otherwise be 
able to afford. By improving nutrition and diets, the programs also are intended to 
advance other goals, such as improving recipients’ health, reducing household food 
insecurity, and furthering children’s development and school performance. Evidence 
from numerous studies strongly indicates that the programs increase household food 
consumption and improve dietary intakes (see, e.g., Fox et al. 2004). However, the 
evidence regarding health, food insecurity, and schooling effects is equivocal and 
includes many null findings as well as some unexpected associations, such as food 
assistance being related to higher rates of obesity (e.g., Baum 2011, Meyerhoefer & 
Pylypchuk 2008), greater food insecurity (e.g., Nord et al. 2010), and even lower school 
attendance (Peterson et al. 2004, Ribar & Haldeman 2011). Although some of these 
results are likely artifacts of selection bias and other statistical issues (see, e.g., DePolt et 
al. 2009, Nord & Golla 2009), other results appear to be more robust. 
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The negative findings might be explained by unintended and largely unexamined 
effects of food assistance on family routines and activities. Consider one such routine—
the family eating breakfast together. Merten et al. (2009) found that irregular breakfast 
consumption, a predictor of obesity, was higher among adolescents whose parents were 
not present at breakfast time. Participation in different types of food assistance programs 
could affect the frequency of shared breakfast times. On the one hand, participation in the 
SNAP could increase the availability of food and especially of food that might need 
additional preparation and thereby contribute to more shared household breakfasts. On 
the other hand, participation in the SBP could reduce household breakfasts. Also, if 
SNAP participation leads to more variable food availability (plentiful food early when 
monthly benefits are issued but shortages later when benefits are exhausted), breakfast 
routines could be disrupted.  
Other routines could also be affected with consequential effects for children and 
youths. Meal routines seem especially important. Devault (1991) has described the 
centrality of meals as an “organizer of family life” (p. 38). The event of a meal not only 
involves feeding but also provides opportunities to converse, instruct, monitor family 
members, give stability, demonstrate affection, and generally produce “family.” Research 
confirms many of the benefits. For instance, regular family mealtimes have been found to 
be associated with better dietary intakes and healthier eating habits for adolescents 
(Neumark-Sztainer 2006), the transmission of culture to children (Ochs & Shohet 2006), 
language development (Snow & Beals 2006), improved psychological well-being among 
children (Fiese et al. 2006), and lower rates of youth substance abuse and risky behaviors 
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(National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 2010). Regular family routines, 
including eating meals together, are also associated with better control of children’s 
asthma (Schreier & Chen 2010) and diabetes (Greening et al. 2007).  
For this study, we use data from the Three-City Study, a longitudinal survey of 
2,458 low-income families, to examine how family routines (including shared meals) and 
time use vary with participation in public and private food assistance programs. Although 
family routines have been studied extensively in other contexts, our study is one of only a 
handful that examine these processes and food assistance. 
One study by Roy et al. (2012) examined how parents’ and teenagers’ time use 
differed with participation in different combinations of food assistance programs. 
Consistent with expectations, they found that parents spent less time preparing food and 
engaging in primary eating activities if their children received school meals but the 
family did not participate in the SNAP. However, they unexpectedly found that parents 
who participated in SNAP spent less time in primary eating activities and that adolescents 
who simultaneously participated in some but not all food assistance programs spent less 
time in primary eating activities. While provocative, a shortcoming of this research is that 
it used individual time-diary data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) that were 
limited to people aged 15 and over (e.g., excluded younger children and teenagers) and 
that had very limited information on interactions between parents and children. 
Additionally, the ATUS has relatively few demographic and household measures. 
Another recent study by Waehrer (2008) used the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics and found that children who received school meals reported fewer (primary) 
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eating activities, especially on weekdays. A shortcoming of Waehrer’s study is that 
primary eating activities tend to be under-reported, especially when people are at school 
or at work. These reporting anomalies could explain the unexpected results. In a different 
context, a qualitative investigation of school breakfast clubs in the U.K. by Shemilt et al. 
(2003) found that parents in participating households reported fewer problems getting 
their children to eat regular breakfasts and reduced time pressure and stress on school 
mornings than other parents. 
Our study uses a richer set of outcome measures than these earlier studies. Some 
of the outcome measures from the Three-City Study are based on one-day recall diaries 
describing the activities of both a parent and a child, while others are based on short 
recall and “usual-activity” questions. Another advantage of our study is that it examines 
measures that were collected longitudinally and prospectively. The availability of 
longitudinal data allows us to estimate fixed-effects specifications that can mitigate 
selection biases associated with omitted variables. 
 
Conceptual Approach 
 
Our empirical analysis is grounded in a household production framework (Becker 
1965, Gronau 1977) that is modified to incorporate temporal routine (Hamermesh 2005). 
We begin with a standard household production model in which parents are assumed to 
have preferences over “commodities,” such as meal consumption, household health 
outcomes, and their children’s developmental outcomes, that are produced using inputs of 
time and goods. The activities that we examine can be viewed as time inputs, while food 
assistance from federal and private programs would be goods inputs. Households also 
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face constraints on their available time and budgets. Households choose activities and 
goods purchases to advance their preferences subject to the production, time, and budget 
constraints. 
Food assistance programs (and transfer programs generally) are intended to 
improve well-being among low-income households by providing them with additional 
goods which should allow them to achieve better nutritional outcomes. However, Vickery 
(1977) has cautioned that it is important to consider goods needs, time needs, and their 
interrelationship when assessing poverty relief. Depending on the household production 
functions, the specific characteristics of the assistance, household preferences, and other 
characteristics, different types of food assistance could substitute for or complement 
certain types of household activities.  
SNAP and WIC benefits can only be used for unprepared food and ingredients, 
many of which require additional preparation to form consumable meals. Thus, to take 
advantage of SNAP and WIC assistance, families must not only allocate time for meal 
consumption but also for meal preparation. Rose (2007) reviewed lunch and dinner 
recipes that were recommended as part of the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP, the basis for 
SNAP benefit guarantee) and estimated that preparing the recipes would require at least 
16 hours a week; Rose’s estimate likely understated the total time inputs of the TFP 
because it excluded shopping, clean-up, and the preparation of other non-recipe meals. 
Rose also examined time-use data and found that non-working women in SNAP 
households reported spending six more hours a week preparing meals than non-working 
women generally.   
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Changes in meal preparation could, in turn, affect other activities. On the one 
hand, more time in meal preparation could increase the availability of parents for 
secondary activities (activities that can be performed jointly with meal preparation). For 
instance, children could be playing quietly or doing their homework while caregivers are 
preparing meals. Through an effect on preparation times, the receipt of food assistance 
could increase these routines. On the other hand, increased preparation time associated 
with food assistance could cause families to substitute away from (could crowd out) other 
family activities in order to satisfy these new demands on their time. An obvious activity 
to consider is meal consumption. Analyses of meal times often fail to distinguish between 
preparation and consumption, but Woodward (2012) has shown that these activities are 
very different, with preparation having properties that we commonly associate with 
household production tasks and meal consumption having properties we associate with 
leisure activities. Consistent with this distinction, ethnographic evidence from a subset of 
the families in the Three-City Study indicates that some poor working mothers use meals 
from fast food restaurants as an explicit strategy to increase time available for 
consumption by reducing time needed for preparation (Tubbs et al. 2005). Other activities 
could also be affected by changes in meal preparation time.  
In contrast to the benefits from the SNAP and WIC, assistance from the SBP and 
NSLP consists of complete meals, which do not involve time parental inputs and are also 
consumed outside the home. If we just consider breakfasts and lunches as household 
commodities, the SBP and NSLP would add to household resources, while reducing time 
pressures on parents. However, if family meal consumption (or preparation) is an activity 
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that is valued by itself or that contributes to the production of other commodities, the 
provision of school breakfasts and lunches could create pressures for parents to 
compensate with other activities, such as increasing the frequency with which they eat 
dinner together or engage in non-meal activities. 
So far, we have considered the implications of food assistance in the context of 
the standard household production approach, which considers the incidence and amount 
of activities performed but not their timing. Hamermesh (2005) extended the standard 
model by assuming that (a) people have preferences regarding commodities and the 
timing of activities and (b) the production of commodities is made more or less costly by 
certain timing patterns. For our purposes, we could view “routine”—the same activity 
being repeated across days—as something that parents value but also as something that 
parents find costly to maintain.
41
 Some implications from this model are that more 
resources, either in terms of money or assistance, should also allow families to obtain 
more routine and that family activities will be strongly affected by external temporal cues, 
such as work or school schedules. Consistent with this, Crouter and McHale (1993) found 
that parental involvement and monitoring were associated with seasonal school schedules 
and parental employment. However, in another article that uses data from the Three-City 
Study, Coley et al. (2007) found that family routines were not associated with work or 
welfare transitions.  
Within this framework, the possible effects of food assistance on household 
behaviors depend on parents’ valuations of routine and structure as opposed to variety. 
                                                        
41 Hamermesh actually examined the opposite case with his model, positing that people desired variety but 
found variety costly to produce. 
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Those valuations could differ with culture or class. For example, Lareau (2003) has 
described how less-affluent and working-class parents often rely on the “accomplishment 
of natural growth” as a child development strategy, which leads them to provide less 
supervision and encourage fewer structured activities for their children. Consistent with 
this, Kalenkoski et al. (2011) found that teenagers in disadvantaged circumstances spent 
less time in non-classroom educational activities but more time in unsupervised other 
activities. A perception that disadvantaged families lack or undervalue structure has 
motivated some policy analysts to recommend paternalistic assistance policies that 
mandate structure (see, e.g., Kane 1987 and Mead 1997). In this context, it is possible 
that participation in food assistance programs, like the School Breakfast Program, 
provide an external temporal cue that allows low-income households, like the ones in our 
sample, to add structure to their days and strengthen their family routines.  
However, the costs of coordination could also differ across families. Roy et al. 
(2004) documented how break-downs in child care arrangements, irregular and non-
standard work hours, a reliance on public transportation for work and shopping, and 
numerous institutional appointments interfered with poor families’ ability to structure 
their time. In this case, participation in food assistance program may have no effect on 
family routines because these families might not have the flexibility to adjust the use of 
their time and routines. 
As this discussion indicates, standard theories lead to equivocal predictions. 
Possible effects of food assistance on family routines could vary depending on whether 
the assistance increases or decreases meal preparation activities, whether preparation 
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activities can be conducted jointly with other activities, and whether households place 
higher valuations on routine or variety. Previous research is also equivocal. Our empirical 
analysis will address the open question regarding the relationship between food 
assistance and family routines using a low-income sample.  
 
Data 
 
For our empirical analyses of family routines and time use we use data from the 
Three-City Study, a longitudinal survey of 2,458 children and their caregivers who were 
initially living in low-income neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio. At 
the time of the first interview in 1999, the families all had incomes below 200 percent of 
the poverty line and had at least one child either 0-4 or 10-14 years old, whom the study 
designated as a “focal child.” Although the survey included many public assistance 
recipients, it was not specifically restricted to these groups. It was also designed to 
include poor and near-poor families, so there are many families who could potentially 
become eligible for assistance if their economic circumstances shifted. Thus, the study is 
especially well-suited for comparing households with and without different types of food 
assistance. 
After the initial interviews, follow-up interviews were conducted in 2000-1 and 
2005.  Retention rates were high with 88 percent of the original sample participating in 
the second round and 80 percent participating in the third round. In each wave, interviews 
were conducted with both the focal child and the child’s caregiver. In cases where the 
child and caregiver separated, both were subsequently followed and interviewed.  
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For our analyses, we focus on households with focal children from the older 
cohort (10-14 years old at the initial interview). These children were school-aged in 
waves 1 and 2 and therefore potentially eligible to participate in school meal programs. 
The observations for these households could also be used in longitudinal analyses. In 
contrast, children from the younger cohort were not school-aged until wave 3 and could 
not be used in longitudinal analyses. We further focus on information provided by 
caregivers (almost always the focal children’s mothers), who were asked questions 
regarding family routines, their children’s schedules, household food assistance, and 
other characteristics of their households. We restrict our analyses to caregivers who were 
respondents in each of the first two waves of the Three-City Study, who continued to co-
reside with the focal children (continuing caregivers), whose focal children were 
attending elementary school, middle school, junior school, high school or vocational 
school in the two waves, and who were interviewed during the school year (September-
May) in both waves. We also drop observations with missing information for the 
outcome or explanatory variables. We exclude information from the third wave of the 
Three-City Study because many of the older cohort of focal children had already 
completed or left secondary school by this time and because these children were 
relatively old (generally 16 or older).We consider continuing respondents to facilitate 
longitudinal analyses, and we focus on households with enrolled children during the 
school year to examine the roles of school meal programs. 
There were 1,158 households with focal children from the older cohort in the 
initial wave of the Three-City Study. Of those, 1,011 had continuing caregivers who were 
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also respondents in the second wave. Among those, there were 956 who had focal 
children attending elementary school, middle school, junior school, high school or 
vocational school in the first and second waves of the survey, and 627 were interviewed 
during the academic years in those waves. There were 521 caregivers with no item non-
response to the questions used as explanatory variables, leaving a sample of 1,042 
person-year observations. For our analyses of daily schedules, we further restrict the 
sample to reports that describe a weekday. Of the 521 caregivers that satisfy our baseline 
set of restrictions, 319 had reports describing a weekday on the first and second waves of 
the Three-City Study, resulting in 638 potential person-year observations. 
 Outcome measures.  In each wave of the Three-City Study, caregivers were 
asked five questions regarding regular family routines. Two of the questions asked about 
meals: how often the family ate dinner/supper together and how often some of the family 
ate breakfast together in the morning. The possible responses included “almost never,” 
“sometimes,” “usually,” and “always.” In addition to meal routines, caregivers were also 
asked how often 
 
 the family spent time talking or playing quietly, 
 the children spent time doing homework, and 
 the family observed consistent bedtimes for children. 
 
 
Our analysis separately examines the responses to each of the questions regarding the 
frequency with which families engaged in particular types of routines. It also examines a 
composite, recoded measure that is formed by averaging the categorical responses from 
the five questions. 
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 Caregivers were also asked about the periods of time that they and the focal 
children spent apart during the previous day. The survey asked about up to five spells 
apart. For each spell, caregivers provided the start and stop times, their locations, and 
their children’s locations. We use these measures to examine the total time the caregiver 
spent apart from the focal child and the timing of caregiver’s first separation from the 
child, if a separation occurred. 
Food assistance. In each wave, the Three-City Study asked caregivers about their 
household’s participation in several specific food assistance programs, including the 
SNAP, NSLP, and SBP, and WIC. In addition, caregivers were asked about their use of 
local food pantries and food banks. We create binary indicators for the receipt of these 
five types of assistance. These measures of government and private food assistance are 
the primary independent variables in the empirical analyses.
42
 
Other explanatory measures. Our analyses include a rich set of additional 
explanatory measures that are available from the Three-City Study and that may be 
correlated with the outcomes of interest and with food assistance. To account for 
economic resources, we include a measure of the household’s total monthly “cash” 
income at the time of the interview from all sources. We measure welfare participation 
with an indicator for current receipt of benefits from the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) program. To account for wealth, we include indicators for whether the 
household owned a home, vehicle, held financial assets, or had outstanding loans. We 
                                                        
42
 Although the focal children in our analysis sample were too old to be eligible for WIC, they may have 
had other household members who were eligible. Woodward and Ribar (2012) report evidence that WIC 
assistance may be shared among household members. 
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measure the demographic composition of the household with variables for the number of 
adults in the household, the number of children, and the age of the youngest child.  
We also include measures of the caregiver’s work status. All models include 
indicators for whether the caregiver was working full time or part time. The health status 
of the caregiver is measured by an indicator for work- or activity-limiting disabilities and 
by a general self-reported index of health. Other characteristics of the caregiver such as 
marriage and cohabitation status, age, race and ethnicity, nativity, and education are also 
included. We also incorporate measures of social networks. We include binary measures 
of the extent of social networks that indicate whether the caregiver reports having enough 
people who will listen, provide childcare, help with small favors and loan money. 
Additionally, we include variables that control for the focal child’s age and gender. 
Finally, there are indicators for the wave of the interview, the month of the interview, and 
the city of residence. 
The Three-City Study used a stratified sampling design. In addition, the study 
experienced modest levels of attrition over time. To account for these design and attrition 
issues, all of our empirical analyses incorporate sampling weights that are provided with 
the study. 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
We examine unconditional means of the families’ and children’s outcomes and 
characteristics as well as means conditional on the receipt of different forms of food 
assistance. The means are reported in Table 3.1. 
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Comparisons of means reveal only small differences in family routines and daily 
schedules among households with different patterns of school meal participation. None of 
these differences is statistically significant. Differences do appear when we consider WIC 
receipt. WIC households have dinner together more often, have more consistent 
homework schedules, and observe more consistent bed times than non-WIC households. 
Also, children in WIC households separate from their caregivers about an hour earlier 
than those from non-WIC households. SNAP participation is associated with less 
frequent occurrences of the family spending time talking or playing quietly together.  
The children differ in other characteristics. Children who receive school meals are 
more likely to live in households that receive TANF, have lower incomes, have fewer 
assets and financial accounts, and have more children. The caregivers of children that 
receive school meals are less likely to have a college education and less likely to be 
married with a spouse present. Families of children who receive school meals have more 
and younger children. Even though there are no citizenship requirements to participate in 
the school meal programs, the caregivers of children who receive them are less likely to 
be foreign born. Families that receive WIC have more and much younger children; 
caregivers are more likely to be younger than non-WIC households. Households that 
receive SNAP are more likely to receive welfare, have lower incomes, fewer assets and 
financial accounts, fewer adults, more and younger children than non-SNAP households. 
Also, caregivers in SNAP households are less likely to be high school graduates and less 
likely to be married with spouse present. Since 1997 people who are foreign born have 
faced restrictions on food stamp use; this is reflected in the data that shows that 
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caregivers who receive SNAP are less likely to be foreign-born. Because of the 
differences in the children’s household, caregiver, and own characteristics, we also 
undertake multivariate analyses. 
 
Multivariate Analyses 
 
We estimate multivariate models of the family routine and time use outcomes that 
account for other observable characteristics and, where possible, some types of 
unobservable characteristics. For the multivariate analyses, let Yit denote a measure of 
either a family routine or time use outcome for household i in survey wave t. Let Fit be a 
vector of public and private food assistance measures for the same household and time 
period, and let Xit be a vector of other observed characteristics of the household. We 
estimate two principal types of models. 
First, we estimate regression models of the form 
 
 
Yit =  AOLS´ Fit + BOLS´ Xit + εit    (3.1) 
 
 
where εit represents unobserved characteristics of the household and AOLS and BOLS are 
vectors of coefficients to be estimated. In the model, the estimates of AOLS represent the 
conditional associations of food assistance with the household outcome. The 
specifications are pooled regression models.
43
 
 Second, we also utilize the longitudinal data to estimate household fixed effect 
models. Suppose that the unobserved characteristics in εit can be decomposed into a time-
                                                        
43
 For the family routines measures, which are ordered categorical outcomes, we have also estimated 
appropriate qualitative dependent variable models with results that are similar to those reported here. 
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invariant, household-specific component, ηi, and a time-varying component, νit, such that 
εit = ηi + νit. The fixed effects model can be written 
 
Yit =  AFE´ Fit + BFE´ Xit + ηi + νit.     (3.2) 
 
 
The fixed effects procedure uses differencing to condition out the ηi. The resulting 
estimates of AFE represent associations of the food assistance programs with the outcome 
measures that condition on the observed characteristics and the household-specific 
unobserved characteristics, thus removing a potential source of biasing heterogeneity. 
 Although the fixed-effects procedure addresses some forms of omitted-variable 
bias, it does not address biases caused by time-varying unobserved characteristics that 
may be associated with family routines and the receipt of food assistance programs. For 
example, unmeasured changes in household needs that cause families to take up food 
assistance and change their family routines could still contribute biases.  
 The fixed-effects procedure also places demands on the data. Depending on the 
outcome under analysis there are between 256 and 503 households that satisfy our sample 
restrictions. Within these households, 15% of children switched their participation status 
in the SBP; 13% switched their participation in the NSLP; 16% switched their WIC 
participation, and 19% of families changed their SNAP participation. The modest sample 
sizes and limited number of program changes reduce the statistical power of the analyses 
and our ability to draw statistical inferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
105 
Ordinary Least Squares Results 
 
Selected coefficients and standard errors from OLS models of family routines and 
time schedules are reported in Table 3.2.  Specifically, Table 3.2 lists coefficients for 
participation in the public and private food assistance programs, participation in TANF, 
and total household cash income. Full results are reported in Appendix G.  
As with the descriptive analysis, participation in the SBP is only weakly 
associated with family routines and daily schedules. None of the associations is 
statistically significant. Several of the coefficients for participation in the NSLP are larger 
in magnitude. For instance, NSLP participation is negatively associated with breakfast 
routines, though it falls just short of being statistically significant. NSLP participation is 
also negatively associated with dinner routines and positively associated with total hours 
apart, albeit with imprecise estimates that are consistent with positive or negative effects. 
Also consistent with the descriptive results, SNAP participation is negatively 
associated with family-time routines, with estimates that can be statistically distinguished 
from zero. SNAP participation is also associated with significantly later daily separation 
times for children. WIC participation is significantly associated with fewer breakfast 
routines, more dinner routines, more homework routines, and more family-time routines. 
Food pantry use is not significantly associated with any of the family routines in 
the OLS models. However, it is associated with earlier daily separation times. Similarly, 
TANF participation is not significantly associated with family routines or daily schedules, 
which is similar to the findings of Coley et al. (2007). Higher levels of household income 
are associated with fewer dinner routines, less consistent bed times, and fewer family 
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routines generally. These results are consistent with Hamermesh’s (2005) finding that 
variety is a normal good.  
 
Longitudinal Fixed-Effect Results 
 
A concern with the preceding estimates is that unobserved characteristics that are 
related to the outcome measures and food assistance could be confounding the results. If, 
for instance, families with good organization skills are more likely to receive food 
assistance and also more likely to have strong family routines, then OLS coefficient 
estimates could be over-estimated. On the other hand, if families with good organization 
skills are less likely to receive food assistance program, then OLS coefficient estimates 
could be under-estimated. Because of the availability of longitudinal data, we can address 
potential biases associated with time-invariant characteristics by estimating fixed effects 
models. Estimated coefficients and standard errors from those models are reported in 
Table 3.3. 
Estimates from the fixed effects models indicate that participation in the SBP is 
not strongly associated with family routines. However, SBP participation is associated 
with earlier separation times for children, a result that is consistent with mothers leaving 
home earlier to work or children leaving home earlier to take advantage of school 
breakfasts. The size of the effect seems more consistent with the work time explanation. 
SBP participation is also associated with longer times apart, though the estimate is 
imprecise. Participation in the school lunch program is also only modestly associated 
with family routines and more strongly associated with earlier and longer separation 
times; all of the associations, however, are insignificant. 
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SNAP participation is significantly negatively associated with homework routines. 
There is also evidence that SNAP participation may be negatively associated with dinner 
routines. WIC participation is significantly positively associated with dinner routines, 
homework routines, family-time routines, and family routines generally. Food pantry use 
is associated with fewer family-time routines and earlier separation times. 
TANF receipt is only weakly associated with family routines but is strongly 
associated with later separation times and fewer hours apart. In contrast, higher levels of 
family income are associated with fewer dinner routines, fewer family routines overall, 
and more hours apart. 
Among the other characteristics (Appendix H), the wealth measures are 
negatively correlated with a number of family routines. More minors in the household are 
associated with stronger family routines, a greater frequency of eating breakfast together, 
more homework routines, and earlier separation times. The age of the youngest child is 
positively associated with stronger family routines, more dinner routines, more bedtime 
routines, and earlier separation times. Full-time work by the caregiver is associated with a 
greater frequency of eating breakfast together, but with less frequent homework routines. 
Part-time work is also associated with less frequent homework routines, and with later 
separation times, which might be consistent with evening work. Caregivers who are 
married with a spouse present spent less time separated from the focal child and have 
later separation times. Cohabitating caregivers report more homework and bedtime 
routines than single caregivers.  
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Sensitivity Analyses 
 
One potential concern is that participation in multiple programs at the same time 
creates multicollinearity problems preventing to find statistically significant associations 
between food assistance programs and the outcomes described in this paper. Eligibility 
requirements are the same for the SBP and NLSP, and children living in families that 
receive SNAP are also eligible to receive reduced price meals at school. However, the 
Variance Inflation Factor for each one of the food assistance variables is less than 2 
suggesting that our results are not affected by multicollinearity. 
 
Discussion 
 
Despite evidence linking family routines to positive health and developmental 
outcomes for children, such routines have not been examined in studies of the broader 
impacts of food assistance programs in the U.S. Data from the Three-City study allow us 
to address that gap. In longitudinal fixed effects analyses, we find statistically significant 
evidence that participation in the SNAP is associated with fewer homework routines and 
less precise evidence that participation in SNAP is associated with fewer dinner routines. 
These negative correlations were also observed in linear regression models, although the 
coefficient estimates in those models were smaller and not precisely estimated. The 
negative effect on these routines could be a consequence of an increase in meal 
preparation time, which causes caregivers to substitute away from dinner consumption 
and time spent in homework activities.  
The longitudinal models indicate that WIC participation is associated with the 
family eating dinner together more frequently, more homework routines, higher 
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frequency of the family talking or playing quietly together, and more family routines in 
general. Many of these positive associations were also observed in the linear regressions 
models and could be the result of a compensating effect. WIC provides food ingredients 
for the younger children in the household, so it is possible that caregivers compensate the 
differential in food availability by spending more time with members of the household 
that are not direct beneficiaries of the WIC assistance. The positive association between 
WIC and dinner routines could also be the result of the nutritional education component 
of the program. One of the main objectives of this component is to “assist individuals in 
nutritional risk achieve a positive change in dietary habits” (U.S. Food and Nutrition 
Service, 2010). 
Both linear regression models and longitudinal models suggest only a weak 
association between school meals and family routines. However, longitudinal models 
suggest that children who participate in the School Breakfast Program separate earlier 
from their caregivers.  
 Food pantry use is estimated to be negatively associated with time spent talking 
or quietly playing with children and with earlier separation times. The availability of 
pantry may be less convenient and its use could interfere with family routines. 
Many of the associations between food assistance programs, family routines and 
time use described in the paper are observed both in the linear regression and longitudinal 
models. However, some cautions need to be applied to our analyses. As we discuss, the 
longitudinal models do not address the bias caused by time-varying unobservable 
characteristics correlated with food assistance program participation and family routines. 
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Our analyses also only consider relatively older children, who may not have family 
routines as strong as the ones of younger children. Finally, the analysis in this paper 
could also benefit of larger sample sizes with larger variation in the independent variables 
of interest, which would allow to identify effects with more precision.  
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Table 3.1 – Means of Outcomes and Independent Variables 
 
 
 
All 
0 School 
meals 
1 School 
meal 
2 School 
meals No WIC WIC No SNAP SNAP 
  
 
      Outcomes 
A 
 
 
      Family routines index 2.748 2.849 2.662 2.752 2.726 2.885 2.782 2.696 
Breakfast routines 2.254 2.571 2.546 2.195 2.272 2.146 2.227 2.295 
Dinner routines 2.885 2.972 2.637 2.909 2.825 3.246*** 2.947 2.788 
Homework routines 3.005 3.149 3.011 2.994 2.970 3.220* 3.054 2.929 
Bedtime routines 3.022 3.009 2.838 3.046 2.978 3.292** 3.015 3.033 
Family time routines 2.833 2.844 2.627 2.857 2.829 2.856 2.940 2.666** 
Total hours apart 7.917 7.996 7.910 7.914 7.773 8.525 8.238 7.459 
Start time first separation 8.763 8.490 9.509 8.701 8.976 7.987* 8.439 9.212 
  
 
      Household characteristics  
TANF participation 0.299 0.041 0.346*** 0.311*** 0.287 0.370 0.073 0.631*** 
Monthly income ($1000s) 1.441 2.098 1.285*** 1.415*** 1.422 1.550 1.623 1.175*** 
Own home 0.236 0.447 0.265 0.217** 0.238 0.222 0.343 0.079*** 
Own car 0.422 0.716 0.265*** 0.423*** 0.417 0.453 0.572 0.203*** 
Has financial accounts 0.359 0.633 0.239*** 0.355*** 0.383 0.218** 0.468 0.199*** 
Has outstanding loans 0.461 0.608 0.401 0.458 0.479 0.354 0.550 0.331*** 
Number of adults 1.856 2.507 1.744*** 1.825*** 1.877 1.733 2.035 1.594*** 
Number of minors 2.857 2.039 2.599 2.949*** 2.659 4.020*** 2.563 3.288*** 
Age of the youngest child 8.1 9.8 8.6 7.9* 8.9 3.3*** 8.4 7.6* 
Boston 0.108 0.267 0.104** 0.098** 0.109 0.105 0.124 0.086** 
Chicago  0.649 0.423 0.809*** 0.644** 0.669 0.536 0.565 0.773*** 
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Wave 2  0.500 0.672 0.396** 0.502* 0.506 0.465 0.513 0.481 
         
Caregiver characteristics 
 
 
      Works full time 0.356 0.499 0.305 0.352 0.346 0.409 0.442 0.228*** 
Works part time 0.169 0.255 0.082 0.174 0.179 0.108 0.170 0.167 
High school graduate 0.370 0.166 0.308 0.393*** 0.405 0.167*** 0.414 0.307* 
College education 0.191 0.504 0.323 0.151*** 0.195 0.168 0.244 0.113*** 
Married spouse present 0.298 0.506 0.286 0.285** 0.284 0.382 0.388 0.168*** 
Cohabitating 0.083 0.012 0.152* 0.079*** 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.083 
Foreign born 0.179 0.488 0.061*** 0.173*** 0.181 0.167 0.254 0.070*** 
Health status 2.881 2.798 3.086 2.859 2.918 2.660 2.747 3.077*** 
Disability status 0.267 0.208 0.264 0.271 0.293 0.114*** 0.213 0.346** 
Black 0.582 0.186 0.714*** 0.592*** 0.595 0.508 0.462 0.758*** 
Hispanic 0.389 0.731 0.243*** 0.385*** 0.374 0.479 0.504 0.221*** 
Age 39.4 42.2 42.0 38.8*** 40.3 33.8*** 39.4 39.3 
People who will listen 0.488 0.618 0.404 0.491 0.492 0.470 0.488 0.488 
People who will help with 
childcare 0.494 0.576 0.469 0.492 0.498 0.468 0.493 0.495 
People who helps with small 
favors 0.480 0.595 0.405 0.482 0.465 0.568 0.463 0.506 
People who will loan money 0.386 0.485 0.376 0.380 0.394 0.341 0.417 0.341 
Child characteristics 
 
       
Female 0.549 0.799 0.564** 0.529*** 0.544 0.573 0.515 0.598 
Age 12.8 13.4 12.8 12.7*** 12.8 12.8 12.9 12.7 
         
Proportion of observations 1.000 0.059 0.111 0.831 0.854 0.146 0.594 0.406 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on 1,042 person-year observations of school-enrolled children living with a continuing caregiver interviewed the first 
and second waves of the Three-City Study. All of the statistics were calculated using sample weights. Asterisks indicate whether the means are 
significantly different for children receiving food assistance relative to those who do not. *** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, p<0.1.  
A 
The sample sizes used to calculate mean outcomes are smaller than the one used to calculate mean controls.   
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Table 3.2 – Selected Estimates from Ordinary Least Squares Models of Family Routines and Daily Schedules 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Family 
routines 
Breakfast 
routines 
Dinner 
routines 
Homework 
routines 
Bedtime 
routines 
Family 
time 
routines 
Total 
hours apart 
Start time 
first 
separation 
         
School Breakfast Program 0.070 -0.119 0.146 0.068 0.004 0.250 -0.055 0.090 
 
(0.120) (0.203) (0.163) (0.180) (0.191) (0.180) (1.557) (0.693) 
National School Lunch Program -0.172 -0.448 -0.271 -0.262 0.154 -0.121 1.525 0.055 
 
(0.158) (0.273) (0.190) (0.243) (0.174) (0.222) (1.347) (1.009) 
SNAP -0.053 0.113 -0.186 -0.119 0.104 -0.243* -0.263 1.353** 
 
(0.088) (0.142) (0.170) (0.121) (0.148) (0.124) (1.023) (0.684) 
WIC 0.157 -0.311** 0.492*** 0.387** 0.196 0.254* 0.969 -0.081 
 
(0.098) (0.136) (0.172) (0.151) (0.171) (0.144) (0.966) (0.612) 
Food pantry -0.013 0.245 0.080 0.128 -0.159 -0.220 -0.123 -1.400* 
 
(0.143) (0.210) (0.196) (0.203) (0.187) (0.165) (0.897) (0.728) 
TANF participation -0.040 -0.011 0.025 0.024 -0.136 -0.037 -0.503 -0.859 
 (0.105) (0.174) (0.178) (0.152) (0.153) (0.143) (1.057) (0.802) 
Monthly income ($1000s) -0.085** -0.079 -0.106** 0.005 -0.077* -0.080 0.244 0.470 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.052) (0.064) (0.045) (0.059) (0.362) (0.321) 
         
Number of observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 614 512 
Number of families 
 
503 503 503 503 503 503 307 256 
Note: Estimates from authors’ linear regressions using school-enrolled children living with a continuing caregiver interviewed in the first and second 
waves of the Three-City Study. Regressions also include controls for home ownership; car ownership; whether the household has financial assets and 
outstanding loans; number of adults; number of children; age of the youngest child; city of residency; survey wave; month of interview; caregiver’s full 
time and part time work status, disability status, self-reported health, marriage status, cohabitation status, age, race, ethnicity, nativity, and education; 
access to people who will listen, provide childcare, help with small favors and loan money; and the focal child’s age and gender. Estimates incorporate 
sampling weights. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
***Coefficient different from zero p<0.01 **Coefficient different from zero p<0.05  *Coefficient different from zero p<0.1   
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Table 3.3 – Selected Estimates from Fixed Effects Models of Family Routines and Daily Schedules 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Family 
routines 
Breakfast 
routines 
Dinner 
routines 
Homework 
routines 
Bedtime 
routines 
Family 
time 
routines 
Total hours 
apart 
Start time 
first 
separation 
                  
School Breakfast Program 0.162 0.177 0.008 0.006 0.174 0.291 1.343 -2.381** 
 
(0.162) (0.201) (0.219) (0.248) (0.275) (0.300) (1.741) (1.051) 
National School Lunch Program 0.012 -0.255 -0.025 -0.005 0.125 0.201 1.734 -1.843 
 
(0.165) (0.273) (0.207) (0.360) (0.214) (0.299) (1.961) (1.518) 
SNAP -0.021 0.200 -0.323 -0.324* -0.032 0.069 -0.737 0.079 
 
(0.134) (0.190) (0.208) (0.166) (0.194) (0.271) (1.336) (0.864) 
WIC 0.321* -0.248 0.588** 0.773*** 0.464 0.481** 1.102 -1.196 
 
(0.166) (0.224) (0.257) (0.251) (0.324) (0.205) (1.211) (0.998) 
Food pantry -0.018 0.104 0.193 0.146 0.003 -0.372* 0.068 -3.778*** 
 
(0.138) (0.212) (0.262) (0.217) (0.174) (0.191) (1.327) (1.045) 
TANF participation -0.058 -0.033 -0.084 0.134 0.082 -0.197 -5.262*** 2.087** 
 (0.165) (0.288) (0.229) (0.238) (0.189) (0.252) (1.456) (0.835) 
Monthly income ($1000s) -0.080* -0.099 -0.117* 0.002 -0.029 -0.074 1.227** -0.055 
 (0.047) (0.068) (0.066) (0.078) (0.068) (0.084) (0.483) (0.396) 
         
Number of observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 614 512 
Number of families 
 
503 503 503 503 503 503 307 256 
Estimates from authors’ fixed effects regressions using school-enrolled children living with a continuing caregiver interviewed in the first and second 
waves of the Three-City Study. Regressions also include controls for home ownership; car ownership; whether the household has financial assets and 
outstanding loans; number of adults; number of children; age of the youngest child; survey wave; month of interview; caregiver’s full time and part time 
work status, disability status, self-reported health, marriage status, and cohabitation status; and access to people who will listen, provide childcare, help 
with small favors and loan money. Estimates incorporate sampling weights. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
***Coefficient different from zero p<0.01 **Coefficient different from zero p<0.05  *Coefficient different from zero p<0.1
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APPENDIX A   
ESTIMATING EFFECT ON HEALTH USING SERIES OF PROBITS 
Dependent 
Variable: 
P(Fair or 
Better) 
P(Good or 
Better) 
P(Very Good 
or Better) 
P(Excellent) 
Coefficient Estimates 
   MA*During 
0.040 
(0.010)*** 
0.030 
(0.007)*** 
0.028 
(0.009)*** 
0.001 
(0.007) 
   MA*After 
0.070 
(0.006)*** 
0.062 
(0.009)*** 
0.056 
(0.008)*** 
0.018 
(0.007)** 
Average Treatment Effect on Treated (After Period) 
   MA*After 
0.004 
(0.0004)*** 
0.010 
(0.001)*** 
0.018 
(0.003)*** 
0.006 
(0.002)** 
Effect in Std. 
Deviations 
0.018 0.027 0.037 0.014 
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-
level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
  
 
 
 
130 
APPENDIX B 
ESTIMATING EFFECT ON HEALTH USING SERIES OF LINEAR PROBABILITY 
 MODELS 
Dependent 
Variable: 
P(Fair or Better) 
P(Good or 
Better) 
P(Very Good or 
Better) 
P(Excellent) 
Coefficient Estimates = Average Treatment Effects 
   
MA*During 
0.002 
(0.0008)* 
0.007 
(0.001)*** 
0.011 
(0.003)***
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
     
   MA*After 
0.004 
(0.0004)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.020 
(0.003)*** 
0.003 
(0.002) 
     
Effect in 
Std. 
Deviations 
0.020 0.031 0.040 0.008 
     
Observations 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 2,879,296 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-
level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
 
 
 
 
131 
APPENDIX C  
 FALSIFICATION TESTS USING PRE-TREATMENT DATA 
Dependent Variable: Overall Health 
 
Before: 2001-2003 
After: 2004-2005 
Before: 2001-2002 
After: 2003-2005 
Before: 2001-2002 
During: 2003 
After: 2004-2005 
MA*During -- -- 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
    
MA*After 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
    
Observations 1,144,440 1,144,440 1,144,440 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown; average treatment effects on the treated are available upon request. 
Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level. All regressions include the individual-
level control variables, state fixed effects, and fixed effects for each month in each year. The control group 
consists of all 50 other states. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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APPENDIX D 
 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OVERALL HEALTH AND OTHER HEALTH 
 OUTCOMES 
 Correlation with Overall Health 
Days not in Good Physical Health -0.472*** 
Days not in Good Mental Health -0.255*** 
Days with Health Limitations -0.381*** 
Activity-Limiting Joint Pain -0.322*** 
BMI -0.232*** 
Minutes of Moderate Exercise 0.063*** 
Minutes of Vigorous Exercise 0.130*** 
Smoker -0.118*** 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5 % level.  Observations are 
weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. 
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APPENDIX E 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: STRATIFIED BY GENDER AND AGE 
 
Gender Age 
 
Women Men 18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates 
 
 
    
   MA*During 
0.023 
(0.002)*** 
0.016 
(0.003)*** 
0.027 
(0.004)*** 
0.016 
(0.004)*** 
0.012 
(0.002)*** 
0.021 
(0.002)*** 
       
   MA*After 
0.042 
(0.003)*** 
0.066 
(0.004)*** 
0.081 
(0.006)*** 
0.048 
(0.003)*** 
0.043 
(0.003)*** 
0.042 
(0.002)*** 
       
1
st
 Stage F Statistic 142.34 201.3 105.63 159.19 138.04 224.35 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates 
      
   Insurance 
1.114 
(0.159)*** 
0.420 
(0.107)*** 
0.355 
(0.122)** 
0.413 
(0.164)* 
0.871 
(0.164)*** 
1.424 
(0.266)*** 
       
   1
st
 Stage Residual 
-1.075 
(0.156)*** 
-0.402 
(0.109)*** 
-0.209 
(-0.126) 
-0.401 
(0.162)* 
-0.977 
(0.165)*** 
-1.566 
(0.275)*** 
Local Average Treatment 
Effects       
   P(Poor) 
-0.135 
(0.019)*** 
-0.030 
(0.009)*** 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.025 
(0.010)* 
-0.111 
(0.017)*** 
-0.302 
(0.046)*** 
       
   P(Fair) 
-0.156 
(0.017)*** 
-0.058 
(0.015)*** 
-0.047 
(0.014)*** 
-0.056 
(0.022)* 
-0.122 
(0.020)*** 
-0.142 
(0.020)*** 
       
   P(Good) 
-0.084 
(0.015)*** 
-0.063 
(0.015)*** 
-0.073 
(0.027)** 
-0.068 
(0.028)* 
-0.067 
(0.020)*** 
-0.037 
(0.015)* 
       
   P(Very Good) 
0.151 
(0.012)*** 
0.046 
(0.013)*** 
0.029 
(0.007)*** 
0.042 
(0.017)* 
0.127 
(0.015)*** 
0.209 
(0.019)*** 
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   P(Excellent) 
0.223 
(0.037)*** 
0.106 
(0.026)*** 
0.102 
(0.038)** 
0.108 
(0.044)* 
0.172 
(0.041)*** 
0.198 
(0.053)*** 
Overall Effect in Std. Dev. 0.943 0.357 0.317 0.458 0.747 1.049 
Observations 1,299,806 872,991 483,775 512,155 613,948 562,919 
See notes for Table 2.1.  
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APPENDIX F 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES: STRATIFIED BY AGE AND INCOME 
  Race Household Income 
  White Black Hispanic Other <$25,000 
$25k-
$75k 
>$75,00
0 
First Stage: Any Insurance Coverage 
Coefficient Estimates   
  
MA* 
During 
0.014 
(0.002)*** 
-0.015 
(0.006)** 
0.041 
(0.007)**
* 
0.074 
(0.019)*** 
0.064 
(0.008)*** 
0.016 
(0.003)*** 
0.006 
(0.002)** 
MA* 
After 
0.041 
(0.002)*** 
0.056 
(0.004)*** 
0.093 
(0.006)**
* 
0.136 
(0.011)*** 
0.138 
(0.009)*** 
0.070 
(0.003)*** 
0.015 
(0.002)*** 
1
st
 
Stage 
F Stat. 
177.77 109.23 125.02 88.78 154.01 412.98 31.83 
Second Stage: Overall Health 
Coefficient Estimates 
   
Insura
nce 
0.905 
(0.132)*** 
1.31 
(0.200)*** 
0.319 
(0.157)* 
0.793 
(0.194)*** 
0.446 
(0.069)*** 
0.405 
(0.116)*** 
1.440 
(0.538)** 
        
1
st
 
Stage 
Res. 
-0.905 
(0.134)*** 
-1.276 
(0.205)*** 
-0.240 
(-0.152) 
-0.851 
(0.196)*** 
-0.481 
(0.075)*** 
-0.341 
(0.117)*** 
-1.300 
(0.533)* 
Local Average Treatment Effects 
       
P(Poor) -0.093 
(0.016)*** 
-0.194 
(0.032)*** 
-0.025 
(0.014) 
-0.114 
(0.027)*** 
-0.068 
(0.010)*** 
-0.026 
(0.006)*** 
-0.138 
(0.030)*** 
        
P(Fair) -0.114 
(0.014)*** 
-0.175 
(0.015)*** 
-0.058 
(0.029)* 
-0.107 
(0.024)*** 
-0.071 
(0.011)*** 
-0.057 
(0.015)*** 
-0.189 
(0.043)*** 
        
P(Good) -0.112 
(0.015)*** 
-0.022 
(0.013)* 
-0.029 
(0.013)* 
-0.046 
(0.020)* 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.069 
(0.022)*** 
-0.182 
(0.092)* 
        
P(Very 
Good) 
0.117 
(0.014)*** 
0.158 
(0.010)*** 
0.038 
(-0.020) 
0.106 
(0.020)*** 
0.06 
(0.008)*** 
0.052 
(0.011)*** 
0.203 
(0.013)*** 
        
P(Exce
llent) 
0.202 
(0.030)*** 
0.233 
(0.040)*** 
0.075 
(0.035)* 
0.160 
(0.045)*** 
0.086 
(0.015)*** 
0.101 
(0.032)*** 
0.306 
(0.165) 
Overall 
Effect 
in S.D. 
0.783 1.087 0.271 0.667 0.388 0.381 1.486 
        
Obs. 1,704,544 182,200 247,267 38,786 524,090 1,036,339 612,368 
See notes for Table 2.1.
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APPENDIX G 
ESTIMATES FROM ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES MODELS. FULL RESULTS 
VARIABLES 
Family 
routines 
Breakfast 
routines 
Dinner 
routines 
Homework 
routines 
Bedtime 
routines 
Family time 
routines 
Total hours 
apart 
Start time 
first 
separation 
                  
School Breakfast Program 0.070 -0.119 0.146 0.068 0.004 0.250 -0.055 0.090 
 
(0.120) (0.203) (0.163) (0.180) (0.191) (0.180) (1.557) (0.693) 
National School Lunch 
Program 
-0.172 -0.448 -0.271 -0.262 0.154 -0.121 1.525 0.055 
 
(0.158) (0.273) (0.190) (0.243) (0.174) (0.222) (1.347) (1.009) 
SNAP -0.053 0.113 -0.186 -0.119 0.104 -0.243* -0.263 1.353** 
 
(0.088) (0.142) (0.170) (0.121) (0.148) (0.124) (1.023) (0.684) 
WIC 0.157 -0.311** 0.492*** 0.387** 0.196 0.254* 0.969 -0.081 
 
(0.098) (0.136) (0.172) (0.151) (0.171) (0.144) (0.966) (0.612) 
Food pantry -0.013 0.245 0.080 0.128 -0.159 -0.220 -0.123 -1.400* 
 
(0.143) (0.210) (0.196) (0.203) (0.187) (0.165) (0.897) (0.728) 
        
Household characteristics 
        TANF participation -0.040 -0.011 0.025 0.024 -0.136 -0.037 -0.503 -0.859 
 
(0.105) (0.174) (0.178) (0.152) (0.153) (0.143) (1.057) (0.802) 
Monthly income ($1000s) -0.085** -0.079 -0.106** 0.005 -0.077* -0.080 0.244 0.470 
 
(0.035) (0.055) (0.052) (0.064) (0.045) (0.059) (0.362) (0.321) 
Own home -0.004 0.245** -0.061 -0.050 0.090 -0.291* -1.420* 0.344 
 
(0.097) (0.124) (0.160) (0.134) (0.141) (0.160) (0.842) (0.623) 
Own car -0.253*** -0.277** -0.311** -0.157 -0.325** -0.101 0.147 -0.922 
 
(0.088) (0.119) (0.138) (0.132) (0.133) (0.122) (0.857) (0.591) 
Has financial accounts 0.197** 0.088 0.464*** 0.146 0.190 0.048 0.877 -0.368 
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(0.090) (0.116) (0.134) (0.129) (0.137) (0.126) (0.954) (0.650) 
Has outstanding loans -0.043 -0.186* -0.092 -0.146 0.130 -0.023 1.821** -1.195* 
 
(0.082) (0.109) (0.122) (0.135) (0.140) (0.132) (0.862) (0.661) 
Number of adults -0.030 -0.041 -0.008 -0.038 -0.047 -0.024 0.645* 0.127 
 
(0.046) (0.062) (0.073) (0.065) (0.071) (0.054) (0.388) (0.198) 
Number of minors 0.037 0.026 0.072 -0.050 0.094** -0.042 -0.183 -0.312* 
 
(0.031) (0.053) (0.056) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.261) (0.187) 
Age of the youngest child 0.008 -0.038** 0.032* 0.011 0.021 0.018 -0.083 -0.075 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.102) (0.072) 
Boston -0.129 0.062 -0.389** -0.014 -0.077 -0.111 -0.547 0.349 
 (0.095) (0.147) (0.159) (0.144) (0.131) (0.146) (0.969) (0.776) 
Chicago 0.076 0.159 -0.088 0.199 0.040 0.196 -1.316 1.516*** 
 (0.092) (0.131) (0.149) (0.145) (0.139) (0.141) (0.840) (0.565) 
Wave 2 -0.040 -0.011 0.025 0.024 -0.136 -0.037 -0.503 -0.859 
 
(0.105) (0.174) (0.178) (0.152) (0.153) (0.143) (1.057) (0.802) 
        
Caregiver characteristics 
        Works full time 0.044 0.216 -0.098 -0.013 0.060 -0.001 1.443* 0.849 
 
(0.073) (0.139) (0.125) (0.139) (0.119) (0.122) (0.783) (0.602) 
Works part time -0.156 -0.113 -0.177 -0.007 -0.152 -0.180 -0.297 0.276 
 
(0.096) (0.150) (0.155) (0.131) (0.143) (0.134) (1.047) (0.555) 
High school graduate 0.006 -0.002 0.043 -0.014 -0.032 0.017 1.649* 1.168* 
 
(0.097) (0.144) (0.150) (0.133) (0.131) (0.127) (0.873) (0.678) 
College education 0.135 0.125 0.077 0.198 0.097 0.239* -0.678 0.189 
 
(0.098) (0.135) (0.157) (0.139) (0.151) (0.135) (1.057) (0.906) 
Married spouse present 0.234** 0.225* 0.106 0.173 0.369** 0.234* -3.072*** 1.423 
 
(0.102) (0.135) (0.153) (0.145) (0.143) (0.142) (1.006) (0.880) 
Cohabitating -0.095 -0.364* -0.177 -0.069 0.161 -0.001 -0.086 0.839 
 
(0.103) (0.216) (0.156) (0.143) (0.171) (0.134) (1.231) (0.882) 
Foreign born 0.085 0.198 0.107 0.274* 0.208 -0.175 0.299 -0.025 
 
(0.115) (0.167) (0.161) (0.158) (0.158) (0.162) (0.879) (0.586) 
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Health status -0.010 0.023 -0.038 0.032 -0.025 -0.001 0.074 -0.355 
 
(0.029) (0.058) (0.048) (0.058) (0.046) (0.052) (0.312) (0.296) 
Disability status 0.050 0.102 0.095 0.050 -0.088 0.090 0.510 0.145 
 
(0.091) (0.145) (0.127) (0.142) (0.126) (0.134) (0.807) (0.532) 
Black -0.162 -0.035 -0.345* -0.169 -0.196 -0.074 -0.013 0.589 
 
(0.114) (0.170) (0.181) (0.183) (0.170) (0.162) (1.184) (0.896) 
Hispanic -0.026 0.112 -0.183 -0.124 -0.098 0.066 -0.043 -0.362 
 
(0.129) (0.178) (0.196) (0.196) (0.184) (0.184) (1.179) (0.849) 
Age -0.007 -0.007 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.009 0.009 0.046 0.020 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.047) (0.040) 
People who will listen 0.068 0.005 0.144 0.108 -0.172 0.296** -0.593 0.308 
 
(0.083) (0.142) (0.142) (0.132) (0.117) (0.115) (0.835) (0.758) 
People who help with  -0.030 0.108 -0.165 -0.068 0.229** -0.293** 0.480 0.001 
childcare (0.076) (0.140) (0.114) (0.153) (0.112) (0.114) (0.853) (0.701) 
People who help with 0.133 -0.145 0.134 0.246 0.264** 0.280* -0.126 -2.068** 
small favors (0.089) (0.127) (0.147) (0.170) (0.128) (0.151) (1.056) (1.043) 
People who will loan  0.192** 0.122 0.351*** -0.023 0.050 0.245* 0.357 0.899 
money (0.082) (0.136) (0.128) (0.149) (0.116) (0.137) (0.906) (0.681) 
         
Child characteristics 
        Female -0.177*** -0.145 -0.151 -0.129 -0.082 -0.330*** -0.001 0.362 
 
(0.066) (0.096) (0.109) (0.105) (0.110) (0.086) (0.640) (0.494) 
Number of observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 614 512 
Note: Estimates from authors’ linear regressions using school-enrolled children living with a continuing caregiver interviewed in the first and second 
waves of the Three-City Study. Regressions also control for age of the focal and month of the interview. Estimates incorporate sampling weights. 
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
***Coefficient different from zero p<0.01 **Coefficient different from zero p<0.05  *Coefficient different from zero p<0.1   
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APPENDIX H 
ESTIMATES FROM FIXED EFFECTS MODELS. FULL RESULTS 
VARIABLES 
Family 
routines 
Breakfast 
routines 
Dinner 
routines 
Homework 
routines 
Bedtime 
routines 
Family 
time 
routines 
Total hours 
apart 
Start time first 
separation 
School breakfast program 0.162 0.177 0.008 0.006 0.174 0.291 1.343 -2.381** 
 
(0.162) (0.201) (0.219) (0.248) (0.275) (0.300) (1.741) (1.051) 
National lunch school  0.012 -0.255 -0.025 -0.005 0.125 0.201 1.734 -1.843 
program (0.165) (0.273) (0.207) (0.360) (0.214) (0.299) (1.961) (1.518) 
SNAP -0.021 0.200 -0.323 -0.324* -0.032 0.069 -0.737 0.079 
 
(0.134) (0.190) (0.208) (0.166) (0.194) (0.271) (1.336) (0.864) 
WIC 0.321* -0.248 0.588** 0.773*** 0.464 0.481** 1.102 -1.196 
 
(0.166) (0.224) (0.257) (0.251) (0.324) (0.205) (1.211) (0.998) 
Food pantry -0.018 0.104 0.193 0.146 0.003 -0.372* 0.068 -3.778*** 
 
(0.138) (0.212) (0.262) (0.217) (0.174) (0.191) (1.327) (1.045) 
Household characteristics 
        TANF participation -0.058 -0.033 -0.084 0.134 0.082 -0.197 -5.262*** 2.087** 
 
(0.165) (0.288) (0.229) (0.238) (0.189) (0.252) (1.456) (0.835) 
Monthly income ($1000s) -0.080* -0.099 -0.117* 0.002 -0.029 -0.074 1.227** -0.055 
 
(0.047) (0.068) (0.066) (0.078) (0.068) (0.084) (0.483) (0.396) 
Own home -0.128 0.213 -0.073 -0.215 -0.091 -0.560* 2.132 0.531 
 
(0.144) (0.224) (0.172) (0.217) (0.276) (0.292) (1.459) (1.250) 
Own car -0.188 -0.487*** -0.227 0.007 -0.189 0.152 -1.413 1.060 
 
(0.127) (0.186) (0.217) (0.213) (0.187) (0.205) (1.485) (1.352) 
Has financial accounts -0.240** -0.101 -0.266* -0.079 -0.540*** -0.054 2.089 -0.077 
 
(0.110) (0.159) (0.157) (0.166) (0.201) (0.188) (1.289) (0.962) 
Has outstanding loans -0.003 -0.151 0.057 0.065 -0.022 0.104 -0.031 -0.881 
 
(0.132) (0.151) (0.197) (0.174) (0.183) (0.217) (1.038) (0.752) 
Number of adults 0.011 0.067 0.066 -0.189* -0.122 0.034 -0.062 0.232 
 
(0.071) (0.118) (0.087) (0.097) (0.100) (0.118) (0.721) (0.451) 
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Number of minors 0.156** 0.308*** 0.151 0.317** 0.092 0.073 0.518 -1.081** 
 
(0.075) (0.112) (0.106) (0.141) (0.082) (0.113) (0.615) (0.442) 
Age of the youngest child 0.041* 0.011 0.058* 0.037 0.072** 0.022 -0.125 -0.326** 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.029) (0.037) (0.196) (0.160) 
Wave 2 -0.164** -0.203 -0.191* -0.042 -0.132 -0.129 -0.572 -1.756*** 
 
(0.075) (0.142) (0.114) (0.127) (0.131) (0.119) (0.888) (0.534) 
Caregiver characteristics 
        Works full time 0.049 0.401* -0.068 -0.383* 0.102 -0.238 -0.733 0.915 
 
(0.136) (0.216) (0.199) (0.232) (0.208) (0.215) (1.395) (1.201) 
Works part time -0.128 0.124 -0.060 -0.448** -0.208 -0.368 -2.312 2.454** 
 
(0.142) (0.216) (0.201) (0.203) (0.197) (0.229) (1.642) (1.198) 
Married spouse present 0.190 0.206 0.113 0.125 0.213 0.229 -5.103*** 3.817*** 
 
(0.153) (0.221) (0.233) (0.260) (0.199) (0.273) (1.843) (1.330) 
Cohabitating 0.256 0.422 0.325 0.664** 0.509* -0.232 -0.061 0.230 
 
(0.169) (0.386) (0.268) (0.316) (0.270) (0.302) (1.738) (1.164) 
Health status 0.047 0.019 0.127* 0.029 0.011 0.032 0.816* -0.689** 
 
(0.051) (0.081) (0.072) (0.082) (0.066) (0.083) (0.490) (0.301) 
Disability status 0.190* -0.101 0.411*** 0.273 0.263 0.188 -0.456 0.851 
 
(0.114) (0.170) (0.158) (0.199) (0.172) (0.215) (1.517) (0.951) 
People who will listen 0.107 0.310* -0.012 0.046 -0.015 0.145 -0.513 0.068 
 
(0.108) (0.160) (0.136) (0.154) (0.185) (0.167) (0.944) (0.865) 
People who help with  0.029 -0.037 0.016 -0.128 0.241 -0.105 0.377 0.666 
Childcare (0.101) (0.134) (0.124) (0.184) (0.160) (0.147) (1.012) (0.854) 
People who help with  0.069 -0.395*** 0.295** -0.034 0.200 0.177 -1.737 -2.578** 
small favors (0.092) (0.146) (0.149) (0.252) (0.166) (0.179) (1.538) (1.272) 
People who will loan  0.186 0.327** 0.152 0.264 0.037 0.228 0.654 0.654 
  Money (0.114) (0.156) (0.157) (0.199) (0.171) (0.181) (1.432) (0.981) 
Number of observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 614 512 
Number of families 503 503 503 503 503 503 307 256 
Note: Estimates from authors’ fixed effects regressions using school-enrolled children living with a continuing caregiver interviewed in the first and 
second waves of the Three-City Study. Regressions also control for month of the interview. Estimates incorporate sampling weights. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  ***Coefficient different from zero p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1. 
